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I.  DIVIDED JUSTICES, DIFFICULT DOCTRINE, AND THE DIFFICULTIES IN 
DEMARCATING SUBSTANCE, PROCEDURE, AND DEGREE OF DEFERENCE 
TO STATE LAWMAKING  
In Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance 
Company,1 the United States Supreme Court issued its most significant 
Erie opinion2 of the relatively young twenty-first century, one seemingly 
in tension with its prior most recent major pronouncement on the subject 
in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.3  Both cases involved New 
York civil rules ostensibly4 conflicting with Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  In Gasperini, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) which governs 
judicial review of monetary awards trumped Federal Rule 59 (new trial), 
while in Shady Grove, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) failed to dislodge Federal 
Rule 23 governing class actions—a seeming inconsistency. 
The Gasperini-Shady Grove divide also featured a “clash of the 
titans” division of the Court as well in that Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s more functional approach, arguably too solicitous of state 
 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 2. By “Erie opinion,” I refer to court decisions facing the issue of whether in a case in 
federal court on which state law provides the rule of decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1652, the 
court is to apply federal procedural rules or state law, which may be embodied in either a state 
statute or procedural rule.  The body of law stems from the Court’s decision in Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which held that where a federal court has jurisdiction founded on 
diversity of citizenship per 28 U.S.C. § 1332 state law should be applied rather than any “general 
federal common law,” thus reversing nearly a century of jurisprudence dating from Swift v. Tyson, 
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).  See generally STEPHEN N. SUBRIN, MARTHA L. MINOW, MARK S. 
BRODIN & THOMAS O. MAIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE:  DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, & CONTEXT 817-64 (3d 
ed. 2008) (devoting entire, albeit relatively short chapter of first-year civil procedure casebook to 
Erie issues).  See also LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE ch. 5 (4th ed. 
2009); FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 
2.35-2.39 (5th ed. 2001); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 54-60 (4th 
ed. 1983). 
 3. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 4. I use the term “ostensibly” with some hesitation because it seems like unnecessary 
hedging, but I want to try to be accurate in describing the Erie doctrine.  Where a federal procedural 
rule and a state substantive law (whether denominated as a substantive statute or imbedded in a state 
procedural rule) directly conflict, the court appears to agree that the state law or rule must yield.  
Often, the means of resolving the issue is a finding that the federal and state provisions are not in 
direct conflict and that a federal rule override of the state provision is therefore not necessary.  See, 
e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980), (FED. R. CIV. P. 3, which states that federal 
action is commenced by filing of complaint, not in direct conflict with Oklahoma statute of 
limitations requiring that action be commenced by service upon defendant within two years of tort 
injury; Rule 3 deemed to govern only issues of timing within the federal procedural system, rather 
than an expression of federal policy regarding timely commencement of actions for purposes of 
state limitations periods); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) 
(same as to ostensible federal procedural conflict with Kansas law). 
2
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law, prevailed in Gasperini 5 only to be relegated to a dissent in Shady 
Grove. By contrast, Gasperini dissenter Justice Antonin Scalia emerged 
victorious6 in a more formalist,7 perhaps overly federal court-
empowering plurality opinion reminiscent of Chief Justice Earl Warren’s 
Hanna v. Plumer8 majority opinion.  Critics might term the Scalia 
plurality in Shady Grove as “Hanna on steroids” (or at least a pumped-
 
 5. Compare Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 418 (Ginsburg, J., delivering opinion of the court, joined 
by Justices Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter and Stephen Breyer) with id. at 
448 (Scalia, J., joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas) and id. at 
439 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Scalia). 
 6. Compare Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436 (Scalia, J., joined by Chief Justice John 
Roberts, Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor (except as to Part II.C. of plurality 
opinion) with id. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Stephen 
Breyer and Samuel Alito); id. at 1448 (Steven, J., concurring). 
 7. “Under a formalist regime, the law is seen as a series of first principles laid down for 
application by society to recurring disputes or problems.  Lawyers and judges are to reason 
deductively, from the general rules to specific conclusions, using the first principles in order to 
decide particular cases.”  See BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 
143 (1994).   
Formalism is distinct from instrumentalism, which is sometimes called functionalism.  
Formalism attempts to apply rules through classification of the instant case under a 
general rule or principle and rigorous, deductive application of the selected rule for 
decision.  Instrumentalist adjudication does not disregard the governing rule but 
application of the rule may be modified if strict application would undermine or fail to 
further the function intended to be achieved by the rule or the legal system of which it is 
a part.   
Id. at 145. 
  Applied to Shady Grove and the Erie doctrine, Justice Scalia is a formalist in that he 
embraces a rule or set of rules (e.g., apply federal procedural rules in federal court diversity cases if 
there is an applicable federal rule) while Justice Ginsburg is a functionalist in that she devotes 
greater attention to furthering the public policy goals underlying a doctrine (e.g., avoid differing 
outcomes in state and federal court and discourage federal-state forum shopping) even if at first 
glance a broad application of the general rule (apply federal procedure in federal court) would 
appear to end the inquiry.  As discussed below, broad application of the rule does not end the 
inquiry for Justice Ginsburg because she is concerned that a state procedural rule conflicting with 
the federal rule may in fact embody a state public policy and that failure to apply the state rule will 
lead to disparate results and increased forum shopping.  See infra note 13 and accompanying text.  
  To state the differences between formalism and functionalism is almost itself enough to 
indicate why functionalism has greater support among legal scholars (see infra note 22 and 
accompanying text).  Functionalism just sounds more sophisticated and reasonable while formalism 
seems mechanical and capable of negative unintended consequences.  But as demonstrated by 
Shady Grove itself and the derivation of the New York rule at issue, formalism can have advantages 
not only of greater simplicity, consistency, and predictability but can also achieve equal or better 
policy outcomes while reducing the risk that functionalist judges will unduly elevate misguided, ill-
thought special interest legislation to the level of important state policy. 
 8. 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (where Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is validly promulgated 
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 2072 (1934), it controls where on-point and actually 
regulating procedural matters rather than constituting substantive law exceeding the scope of 
judicial authority to promulgate rules pursuant to the Enabling Act.).  See infra note 12 and 
accompanying text (discussing Hanna and Warren/Scalia approach to Erie). 
3
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up Hanna) in its aggressive view that federal procedural rules eject 
contrary state procedural codes, even where they embody substantive 
state law or policy, so long as the federal rule is actually procedural and 
on point.9 
But Shady Grove lifted Federal Rule 23 over its state counterpart 
only with the support of Justice John Paul Stevens who provided the 
crucial fifth vote regarding the case holding.10  Further, Justice Stevens’s 
support and Justice Scalia’s reaction to it had a “with friends like this, 
who needs enemies?” tone in that both Justices took strong issue with 
each other’s Erie jurisprudence.11  Justice Stevens used a functionalism 
reminiscent of Justice John Harlan,12 an approach somewhat less 
deferential to state law than the functionalism of Justice Ginsburg that 
arguably walked in the footsteps of Justice Felix Frankfurter.13  Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor declined to join that portion of the plurality opinion.14 
 
 9. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing plurality, dissent, and 
concurrence in Shady Grove). 
 10. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Steven, J., concurring). 
 11. Compare id. at 1444-47 (in Part II.C. of the opinion, Justice Scalia engages in extensive 
criticism of Justices Stevens’s approach to case) with id. at 1448-60 (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(disagreeing with much of Scalia’s approach; accepting some of Justice Ginsburg’s basic 
fundamentalist analysis but disagreeing as to its application). 
 12. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring) (agreeing with Chief Justice Earl 
Warren’s opinion as to holding on the merits but taking issue with Warren’s approach as too 
formulaic and insufficiently appreciative of potentially serious state interests that might be 
undermined by Warren’s approach). 
 13. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (majority opinion by Justice Frankfurter 
enunciates “outcome determinative” test for Erie issues, which asks whether application of federal 
procedural rule would provide different outcome in federal court than would obtain in state court.  If 
so, Erie commands application of the state rule to avoid different outcomes and encouragement or 
undue tolerance of forum shopping). 
  In Hanna, 380 U.S. 460, the Court embarked on a two-track approach to Erie questions:  
one for cases where a Federal Civil Rule is directly on point (the approach used in Hanna) and one a 
for other conflicts of federal practice and state law, in which the York outcome determinative test 
still governs.  See TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 2, at ch. 5; JAMES, JR. ET AL., supra note 2, §§ 
2.35-2.39; WRIGHT, supra note 2, §§ 54-60. 
  Justices Harlan and Stevens, while accepting the tests in general urged more judicial 
reflection on whether any difference in outcome would significantly intrude upon state lawmaking 
prerogatives.  If not, they were inclined to defer to the federal approach so long as the conflict fell 
within the ambit of a federal procedural rule, even at the cost of some federal-state differences in 
outcome and some potential for forum shopping.  See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., 
concurring); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Whereas the unadulterated outcome 
and forum-shopping tests may err too far toward honoring state rules, I submit that the Court’s 
‘arguably procedural, ergo constitutional’ test moves too fast and far in the other direction”) 
(emphasis in original). 
  Justice Ginsburg might be offended at the suggestion that her approach to Erie issues is as 
robotic as York’s outcome determinative test, which has been criticized for attempting to turn 
federal judges into “ventriloquist’s dummies.”  See Daniel J. Meador, Transformation of the 
American Judiciary, 46 ALA. L. REV. 763, 765 (1995) (quoting Second Circuit Judge, Yale Law 
4
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Shady Grove was also a wonderful departure from the Court’s 
seemingly predictable ideological divide that has characterized other 
close cases in recent years.  The majority upholding Federal Rule 23 
included conservatives Scalia, Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice 
Clarence Thomas combined with liberals Sotomayor and Stevens while 
the dissenters attempting to privilege the state law were liberals 
Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer joined by conservatives Anthony Kennedy 
and Samuel Alito.15  The division of the Court cut against type, which 
both illustrated the difficulty of Erie issues and provided a bit of 
reassurance that case outcomes are not completely predictable according 
to the Justices’ overall ideology or outcome preferences.  The 
conservative-led majority permitted the plaintiff considerably more 
leverage over a large commercial defendant than it would have obtained 
under state law, a result opposed by the liberal-led dissenters. 
With Stevens’s departure from the Court and replacement with 
Justice Elena Kagan, one can hardly be confident that Shady Grove 
would come out the same way were it reargued today.  And although 
Shady Grove will surely enjoy the stare decisis accorded Erie decisions, 
even when their underlying rationale appears to have shifted,16 the 
Justices’ divisions over approaches to Erie questions leaves litigants, 
 
Dean, and 1938 Federal Civil Rules Reporter Charles E. Clark to this effect).  See also Richardson 
v. Comm’r, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942) (expression of similar sentiments by Second Circuit 
Judge and former Yale Law professor Jerome Frank).  Certainly, Justice Ginsburg’s Shady Grove 
dissent and Gasperini majority opinion are less rote in focusing on outcome difference.  But like 
Justice Frankfurter’s approach, Justice Ginsburg’s approach is highly deferential to state law, 
perhaps unwisely and naively so, as discussed in Part II, infra. 
 14. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1435 (Part II.C. of Scalia opinion criticizing Justice 
Stevens concurrence and rationale joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence 
Thomas; Justice Sotomayor, who joined the rest of the Scalia opinion, declined to join Part II.C.).  It 
appears, at least to me, that Justice Sotomayor must have declined to join Part II.C. of the Scalia 
opinion because of disagreement with the strong formalism favoring federal procedural rules or 
because she may have seen it as too much of an on Justice Stevens, or both.  See infra note 88-94 
and accompanying text (noting that Scalia plurality and Stevens concurrence were at times sharply 
critical of one another). 
 15.  See infra Part II, discussing Shady Grove opinions and Court division. 
 16.  For example, after Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), many questioned the 
continued vitality of Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).  See, e.g., John J. 
McCoid, II, Hanna v. Plumer, The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 U. PA. L. REV. 884 (1966); see 
also Hanna, 380 U.S. at 374, 476 (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that Ragan “if still good law” 
would have counseled a different outcome in Hanna; suggesting that Ragan was wrongly decided 
and Hanna was rightly decided, but for reasons different than given in Hanna majority opinion).  
But despite the arguable inconsistency between Hanna’s federal-rule-trumps-contrary-state-practice 
approach, the Court in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) reaffirmed Ragan, 
refusing to read FED. R. CIV. P. 3 sufficiently broadly to conflict with state procedural law 
measuring the running of the statute of limitations according to whether a complaint against the 
defendant was served within the applicable time period rather than merely filed in federal court. 
5
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lawyers, and policymakers uncertain as to precisely when their state 
laws will or will not displace a federal civil rule in federal court. 
In the few months since its issuance, a good deal has been written 
about Shady Grove, with more surely to come in a mix of criticism and 
praise.17  Some have reservations about the straight-ahead formalism of 
the Scalia plurality opinion and its revival-cum-enshrinement of Sibbach 
v. Wilson & Co., Inc.18 and argue it is too crude a blade for engraving 
the boundaries of the Erie doctrine19 while others see considerable 
 
 17. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2011) (finding Shady Grove correctly decided but criticizing methodology and orientation of all 
opinions in case.  Rather, “[a] single principle – apply state-court rules only when they affect the ex 
ante expected value of a claim in a costless and outcome-neutral procedural world”); Adam N. 
Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism:  Erie and the Rules Enabling Act after Shady Grove, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011); W. Daniel “Dee” Miles, II, Shady Grove v. Allstate:  An 
Erie Sequel(?) and its Effects Moving Forward, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION CLE MATERIALS (July 15-16, 2010) (Shady Grove “has grabbed the attention of both 
litigators and intellectuals alike.  The opinion may either create confusion, consternation, or 
celebration among the legal community, but certainly gives a 21st Century flavor to the Erie 
doctrine and the line of cases which have developed and the result on class action litigation going 
forward.”  (footnote omitted)); Jennifer S. Hendricks, Why the Supreme Court Should Stop 
Freelancing and Go Back to Drawing Lines Between Substance and Procedure (2010), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/jennifer_hendricks/10 (criticizing Ginsburg’s approach in Gasperini and 
advocating greater use of Scalia’s plurality approach in Shady Grove for future Erie cases); Andrew 
J. Ruzicho & Louis A. Jacobs, Forum Shopping, 33 EMPL. PRAC. UPDATE, No. 1 (June 2010) 
(criticizing Shady Grove due to its expansion of opportunities for federal-state forum shopping).  
See also Lucas Watkins, How States Can Protect Their Policies in Federal Class Actions, 32 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 285 (2010) (generally approving of the trial court and Second Circuit decisions 
in Shady Grove on grounds similar to Ginsburg dissent in Shady Grove); Armando Gustavo 
Hernandez, The Head-On Collision of Gasperini and the Derailment of Erie:  Exposing the Futility 
of the Accommodation Doctrine (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1510890 (apparently 
writing prior to Shady Grove; criticizing Gasperini approach and urging more direct, simplified Erie 
jurisprudence more akin to Scalia plurality opinion in Shady Grove); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic 
Statutory Interpretation:  Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 
(forthcoming May 2011). 
 18. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).  See infra note 32 & 72 and 
accompanying text (discussing Sibbach and its place in Scalia plurality opinion in Shady Grove). 
 19. See, e.g., Jack Friedenthal, Defining the Word “Maintain”; Context Counts, 44 AKRON L. 
REV. 1139 (2011) (criticizing Scalia’s approach and Shady Grove outcome); Joseph P. Bauer, 
Shedding Light on Shady Grove:  Further Reflections on the Erie Doctrine From a Conflicts 
Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (advocating more use of state interest 
analysis in resolving Erie questions, although characterizing Shady Grove as case that “does not 
break new ground”) (“The values which are reflected in the Erie doctrine, and in particular the 
importance of federalism, will be enhanced if the Court would take seriously, rather than merely pay 
lip-service to, the agreed benefits of identifying and then deferring to, state interests.”); Catherine T. 
Struve, Institutional Practice, Procedural Uniformity, and As-Applied Challenges Under the Rules 
Enabling Act, NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1676022http://ssrn.com/abstract_1676022http://
ssrn.com/abstract_1676022http://ssrn.com/abstract_1676022http://ssrn.com/abstract_1676022, 
manuscript at 9 (finding, like Professor Ides, infra note 69, that neither Sibbach nor Hanna compels 
6
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benefit to Shady Grove’s more formal simplification of Erie.20  In the 
academy, formalism generally enjoys lower status than functionalism 
 
Shady Grove result;  suggesting excessive formalism in Scalia approach at odds with public policy 
and constitutional concerns underlying Erie doctrine); Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington 
Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove,  159 U. PA. L. REV. 18, 44 (2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1677608 (similar criticisms of Scalia plurality and reiterating 
long-standing criticism of Professor Burbank that Court should not view Enabling Act as concerned 
about federalism when separation of powers was its animating principle) (Shady Grove “path is 
wrong because it perpetuates the federalism myth that Sibbach initiated and Hanna reaffirmed.  It is 
also wrong because, not laid out to reflect that the Act exists primarily to allocate lawmaking power 
prospectively, it leads those who take  it to seek substantive rights in the wrong places.”); Heather 
Gerken, Foreword:  Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 320-30 (2010) (criticizing 
Shady Grove and defending Gasperini approach and holding); Kermit Roosevelt, III, Choice of Law 
in Federal Courts:  From Erie and Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, (University of Pennsylvania 
Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-28, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665092 (arguing that traditional substance/procedure 
dichotomy of Erie doctrine heavily relied upon in Scalia plurality in Shady Grove is unwise and 
Erie questions would be better addressed by standard choice of law methodology, a result that I 
view as likely privileging state law more frequently in state-federal conflict); Allan Ides, The 
Standard for Measuring the Validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure:  The Shady Grove 
Debate Between Justices Scalia and Stevens (Loyola Law School Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 
2010-36, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstrct=1667228 (arguing that Stevens approach is 
both more accurate in assessing precedential value of Sibbach v. Wilson and better for deciding Erie 
questions).   Professor Friedenthal is particularly critical in his assessment. 
The Shady Grove case required much more serious consideration than it was given by 
Justice Scalia and those who signed onto his opinion.  The consequences of the decision 
are of substantial significance.  It effectively permits a final substantive outcome in the 
case that is at odds with what would have been decided in a New York court.  It thus 
results in forum shopping of an extreme nature.  One can only wonder if the Rules 
Enabling Act should be read to permit such a determination.  The case travels far beyond 
the scope of other decisions regarding application of a federal rule in a diversity case. 
Friedenthal, supra 19, at 1144. 
  For the reasons set forth in this article, I largely disagree with Professor Friedenthal’s 
assessment of the alleged unwisdom of the Scalia approach.  In addition, the theoretical availability 
of a class action in federal court hardly leaves Allstate defenseless.  They still may argue against 
certification based on the other considerations set forth in FED. R. CIV. P.23 (and are simply 
deprived of the categorical procedural defense available under New York’s class action rule) and 
may defend fully on the merits.  In addition, Professor Friedenthal’s analysis does not consider the 
somewhat tainted bona fides of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b) described in Part II, infra, and the prospect 
that the formalism of the Shady Grove plurality may spur greater transparency and reflection in state 
lawmaking as well as making Erie adjudication simpler. 
 20. See, e.g., Aaron D. Van Oort & Eileen M. Hunter, Shady Grove v. Allstate:  A Case Study 
in Formalist Versus Pragmatism, 11 ENGAGE 105, 109 (Sept. 2010) (“In our view, the formalist 
majority has the better of the argument in Shady Grove); Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth 
of  Shady Grove, 37-39 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1633541) (noting that after 
Shady Grove, previously difficult questions or reconciling differences between FED. R. CIV. P. 56 
and state summary judgment rules become relatively easy).  See also Jeffrey O. Cooper, Summary 
Judgment in the Shadow of Erie, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1245 (2010); Bernadette Bollas Genetin, 
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(often also labeled pragmatism or instrumentalism),21 even though law 
at its most basic remains a formalist enterprise, with functional 
application of judgment coming into play for more complex or nuanced 
cases.22  Just as the Ginsburg majority opinion in Gasperini appeared to 
enjoy wider acceptance in the academy than the Scalia plurality in Shady 
Grove 23 (and Ginsburg generally gets higher marks than Scalia among 
academics),24 functionalism is generally preferred to formalism.25 
 
 21. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995); KUKLIN & STEMPEL, supra 
note 7, at 141-45;  Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law:  Dusting Off the 
Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1991).  This is not to say, however that formalism 
does not have its prominent and forceful defenders.  See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY 
THE RULES:  A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND 
LIFE (1991); ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
(1990); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism:  On the Imminent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 
949 (1988).  Although a precise empirical tallying of the legal literature is beyond the scope of this 
article (and what’s left of my working life), I am confident that were one to poll law faculty at 
length, one would find considerably more of them supporting functionalism or characterizing 
themselves as functionalist than the other way around. 
 22. I realize that this assertion, like that accompanying the preceding footnote, may be 
difficult to demonstrate to skeptics absent a massive empirical project outside the scope of this 
article.  But it seems to me inarguable that while formalism governs much of the daily application of 
law and holds an important place in jurisprudence, that most legal scholars and arguably the 
profession as a whole is functionalist, at least when faced with difficult cases or cases where rigid 
application of a formalist approach would lead to results at odds with prevailing concepts of justice, 
fairness, and substantive social and economic policy.  Perhaps the greatest proof of formalism’s 
fade in the academy is the degree to which it was dethroned by legal realism and the extent to which 
a post-realist, largely functionalist bent characterizes the vast bulk of legal scholarship.  See KUKLIN 
& STEMPEL, supra note 7, at 149-64 (discussing “vulnerability of high formalism,” influential 
scholars Oliver Wendell Holmes and Roscoe Pound as precursors to the Legal Realist movement as 
well as the movement’s displacement of formalism as the dominant school in the legal academy, 
despite some taming of realism by the Legal Process movement).  See also Anthony J. Sebok, Legal 
Positivism and the Growth of Twentieth Century American Jurisprudence (1993) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with author). 
 23. See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 19, at 320-30 (criticizing Shady Grove and defending 
Gasperini approach and holding). 
 24. Compare Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg:  A Discussion 
of Fifteen Years on the U.S. Supreme Court, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1095 (2009) (collection of articles 
generally praising Ginsburg’s work with little criticism); Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 799 (2009) (same); Symposium, A Celebration of the 
Tenth Anniversary of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Appointment on the Supreme Court of the 
United States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2004) (same) with Bret C. Birdsong, Justice Scalia’s 
Footprints on the Public Lands, 83 DEN. U. L. REV. 259 (2005) (viewing Scalia approach to natural 
resources and public lands issues as detrimental); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 
UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Larry Kramer, Judicial Asceticism, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789 (1991) 
(emphasizing that Scalia’s formalism is still subject to judicial discretion); David A. Strauss, 
Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699 (1991) (commenting on the 
conflict between Scalia’s adherence to tradition, but lack of regard for precedent). 
 25. See KUKLIN & STEMPEL,  supra note 7, at 141-64 (characterizing formalism as tending to 
be overly simplistic and viewing functionalism or instrumentalism as generally superior legal 
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For the most part, I plead guilty to being part of this conventional 
wisdom (at least in the academy if not the legal profession at large), 
particularly when the formalism is accompanied by an excessively 
narrow approach to interpreting text (of a constitution, statute, contract, 
or rule)26 or lacks humility about the quantum of agreement reasonable 
readers might have regarding the meaning of text.27  On this score, 
Justice Scalia, a textual absolutist who seems to just “know” when there 
are no other reasonable constructions of a word or phrase, again gets 
more than his share of academic criticism,28 perhaps deservedly. 
Despite such criticism, Justice Scalia has continued to defend his 
formalism without contrition.29  After Shady Grove, perhaps his critics 
(me included)30 should be grateful about his combative, unabashed 
formalism.  In addition to reinvigorating a Sibbach-Hanna approach31 
that is far simpler to apply as a template for Erie decisions,32 it also may 
have the added effect of enhancing democracy in the states and making 
the policymaking process modestly less susceptible to interest group 
manipulation that flies under the radar of public scrutiny. 
Justice Ginsburg’s Shady Grove dissent is premised on the notion 
that by applying Federal Rule 23 without the limitation on penalty class 
actions found in § 901(b), the Court has done violence to an important 
 
method, noting the rise of functionalism and its eventual displacement of formalism as primary 
school of intellectual legal thought).  See also supra notes 21-24. 
 26. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social 
Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 (2010) (excessive literalist focus on insurance policy text 
can mislead court regarding function and purpose of insurance agreement); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The 
Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT, TRIAL, & INS. L.J. PRAC. 813 (2009) (unduly textualist 
approach to construing insurance policies can lead to decisions at odds with intended function of 
insurance product). 
 27. See Lawrence Solan et. al., False Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1268 (2008) (empirical survey dates reflects readers erroneously believing that nearly all 
others share their interpretation of text). 
 28. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 24; Kramer, supra note 24, at 1797. 
 29. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI.  L. 
REV. 1175 (1989). 
 30. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William’s Ghost:  The Problematic Persistence of the 
Duty to Sit, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 813, 906-07 (2009) (criticizing Justice Scalia’s recusal practices and 
rationale); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens, and 
a Misleading Version of Democracy, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 583 (1991) (criticizing Justice Scalia and 
Court majority for several 1989 Term civil rights and job discrimination decisions (eventually 
legislatively overruled in part) unduly limiting reach of statutes through narrow formalist and 
textualist construction). 
 31. See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text, discussing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. and 
Hanna v. Plumer. 
 32. See Clermont, supra note 20, at 1 (“In the end, Shady Grove has not fundamentally altered 
Erie, but it mercifully makes it more comprehensible”). 
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and well-considered New York policy, undermining the Erie doctrine’s 
aspiration for state’s rights and state-federal symmetry of litigation 
outcomes.  The Shady Grove dissent lauds § 901(b) as “‘the result of a 
compromise among competing interests,’”33 designed in part “as a 
means to a manifestly substantive end.  Limiting a defendant’s liability 
in a single lawsuit in order to prevent the exorbitant accumulation of 
penalty remedies the New York Legislature created with individual suits 
in mind.”34  Similarly, the Stevens concurrence, although less deferential 
to the legislation, saw New York’s carving out of statutory penalty 
claims from class action eligibility as reflecting rational, public-
regarding policymaking.35 
With all due respect to the laudable functionalist orientation of the 
Shady Grove dissent and concurrence, a more searching review of the 
legislative history and environment surrounding enactment of § 901(b) 
presents a far less sanguine picture of the genesis of this class action 
carve-out.  As discussed below,36 this limitation on an otherwise 
generally pro-plaintiff, pro-consumer class action legislation was 
designed (perhaps ironically in light of the subsequent Shady Grove 
litigation) to bring state practice in accord with the federal approach.  
Consequently, § 901(b) looks more suspiciously like interest group 
dilution of progressive legislation through back door channels largely 
hidden from public scrutiny, with little examination of the substantive 
merits of the issue by political elites.  Although not smelling completely 
of the smoke-filled room, the legislative background of § 901(b) hardly 
provides assurance that “the people” of New York viewed this 
constriction on vindication of rights as an integral part of state public 
policy. 
When § 901(b) is seen in this light, the case for the functionalism of 
the Stevens concurrence gets considerably stronger while the dissent’s 
tears over federal overriding of state legislation looks wildly excessive.  
Moreover, the case for the formalism of the Scalia plurality opinion 
becomes considerably stronger.  In addition to removing from the 
analysis the burden of scrutinizing state lawmaking which Justices 
Ginsburg and Stevens shouldered and making unnecessary any judicial 
 
 33.  Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.1431, 1464 (2010) 
(dissent) (quoting Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E. 2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 2007)). 
 34. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1465 (footnote omitted). 
 35. Id. at 1458. 
 36. See infra text and accompanying note 79, at 139-44 (reviewing legislative history of New 
York class action law and criticizing characterization of § 901(b) found in Shady Grove concurrence 
and dissent). 
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reflection over the importance of a particular law to the state (a burden 
shared by the Harlan concurrence in Hanna),37 Justice Scalia’s approach 
also arguably makes it harder for special interests to have their way with 
state law in a manner that trumps federal law.  Under the methodology 
of the Shady Grove plurality, interest groups seeking a particular 
substantive result (e.g., immunity from class action treatment to which 
other claims and defendants are subject), must get such results enshrined 
in substantive law rather than through the stealthier means of engrafting 
private-regarding law onto seemingly non-substantive procedural 
litigation.  In this way, the substantive goals sought by the interest group 
are likely to be more widely and openly assessed by a greater segment of 
both elite policymakers and the public, with the rationale undergirding 
such laws subject to greater critical scrutiny. 
A closer look at the legislative background of § 901(b) suggests it 
was more like the much decried “earmarks” of modern legislation38 than 
the result of serious and sound substantive policymaking.  But under the 
Scalia plurality opinion, one need not engage in an assessment of 
whether § 901(b) is public-regarding public policy or a special under-
the-radar favor for interest groups.  Once § 901(b), has been 
denominated a “procedural” provision by New York, it logically must 
yield to a clear Federal Rule 23 governing class action litigation.  Future 
application of the plurality’s approach to Erie questions, although sure to 
have problems of its own, promises not only greater simplicity and 
predictability but also places more pressure on political actors to win 
their legislative victories in plain sight after giving more persuasively 
reasoned consideration to their proposals. 
II.  THE SHADY GROVE LITIGATION 
Like many eventually high profile Supreme Court cases, Shady 
Grove began with an incident that hardly seemed the stuff of 
 
 37. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 38. See Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L. 
REV. 727, 761-62 (2009) (“[A]lthough earmarks do involve direct congressional involvement in 
spending decisions, they are infected with the stench of backroom politics and abandonment of 
sensible standards.”); Jason Heaser, Note, Pulled Pork:  The Three Part Attack on Non-Statutory 
Earmarks, 35 J. LEGIS. 32, 32 (2009) (“[A] salient feature of earmarks is that they involve funding 
directives in areas that would otherwise demand some sort of competitive bidding process.”); Brian 
Griffith, Note, Lobbying Reform:  House-Cleaning or Window Dressing?, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 863, 
883 (2006) (“[N]o single act would solve more of the ethical problems in Washington than an 
elimination of earmarks in legislation.”).  But see Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress:  
Earmark Rules and Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519 (2009) (presenting earmarks 
in more complex, partially favorable light). 
11
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constitutional law and complex procedural analysis.  Sonia Galvez was 
injured in an auto accident on May 20, 2005.  A Maryland resident, 
Galvez sought care from Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. 
pursuant to a no-fault automobile policy issued by Allstate Insurance 
Company, a citizen of Illinois, its state of incorporation and site of its 
corporate headquarters.  The policy provided, as do standard no-fault 
auto policies, for the payment of personal injury protection or “PIP” 
benefits, including medical care (up to applicable policy limits).39 
As part of the treatment process, Galvez assigned her right to PIP 
benefits to Shady Grove in return for Shady Grove’s medical care.  In 
turn, Shady Grove sought payment from Allstate as Galvez’s assignee.40  
Despite the Maryland locus of injury and treatment, plaintiffs invoked 
New York insurance law as applicable to policyholder Galvez’s relations 
with her insurer.  New York Insurance Law § 5106 (supplemented by 
part 653 of title 11 of the New York Code of Rules and Regulations, the 
state’s administrative enforcement of the statute), provides that insurers 
must pay undisputed medical bills within thirty days of properly 
documented submission, with unpaid claims accruing interest charges at 
the rate of two percent per month.41 
 
 39. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. et. al. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467, 
469-70 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 40. See Shady Grove, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 470. 
 41. See id. at 471.  The Shady Grove trial court summarized the law’s application to cases 
such as the Shady Grove medical treatment of Galvez as follows: 
  Under New York State’s Motor Vehicle No-Fault Insurance Law (the “no-fault 
statute”), automobile insurers are required to reimburse policyholders (or insureds), for 
certain “basic economic loss” (also known as “no-fault benefits”).  See N.Y. Ins. Law § 
5102(a)(1).  Insureds can assign their right to payment for no-fault benefits to health care 
providers who, in turn, may submit claims directly to insurance companies and receive 
payment for the claims. 
  To effectuate the prompt and efficient resolution of claims under the no-fault statute, 
the New York State Superintendent of Insurance, in 1977, adopted regulations 
establishing time  frames in which to submit forms and notices pertaining to such claims.  
See generally Medical Soc’y v. Serio, 800 N.E.2d 728, 768 (N.Y. 2003).  In their current 
form, the regulations require that the insured, or her assigned provider, submit proof of 
loss arising from medical treatment within 45 days from the date of treatment.  See 
N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 11 § 65-1.1(d).  The insurance company, in turn, has thirty days from 
receipt of the claim to (i) pay the policyholder (or the medical provider if the claim was 
assigned) or (ii) deny the claim.  See N.Y. Ins. Law §5106(a); N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 11 § 65-3.  
Payments made by the insurance company after the 30-day period are deemed “overdue” 
and subject to a penalty of two percent interest calculated monthly.  See N.Y. Ins. Law § 
5106(a); N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 11 §§ 65-3.8(a), 65-3.9(a).  The 30-day period can be extended 
under certain circumstances if the insurer timely request verification of the medical 
services for which reimbursement is sought.  See N.Y.C.R.R. tit. 11 § 65-3.5.  In that 
situation, payment must be made within 30 days after the information is supplied to the 
insurer.  See N.Y. Ins. Law § 5106(a).  In sum, the no-fault statute was enacted to 
12
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In a scene unfortunately familiar to medical providers and 
policyholders, Allstate failed to make timely payment of the doctor’s 
bill.  Invoking the prompt payments law and seeking recompense 
pursuant to the mandatory interest provisions, Shady Grove and Galvez 
brought suit in April 2006 
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated.  The proposed 
class, as defined in the complaint, includes all persons to whom 
Allstate owes interest under [§ 5106 and accompanying regulations] 
with respect to claims for first-party no-fault benefits arising since 
April 20, 2000.  Plaintiffs contend that Allstate routinely fails to pay 
covered claims for first-party no-fault benefits within the statutorily 
mandated time period and routinely ignores its obligation to pay the 
statutory interest owed in such cases.  Additionally, plaintiffs allege 
that Allstate routinely and falsely claims to have never received the 
insured’s proof of loss in the first instance, so as to avoid violation of 
the statutory time restrictions. 
. . . . 
. . . As a class, plaintiffs seek a declaration establishing the parties’ 
rights, duties, status or other legal relations under affected insurance 
contract.  Finally, plaintiffs seek compensatory damages in the form of 
interest owed to Shady Grove, Galvez and all others similarly 
situated.42 
Allstate moved to dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Although there was complete diversity between Maryland 
citizen Shady Grove and Illinois citizen Allstate, the amount at issue in 
the Galvez claim, even with the two percent per month interest charges 
sought against Allstate amounted to only approximately $500,43 well 
short of the $75,000 minimum amount in controversy required to sustain 
diversity jurisdiction.44  Only if Shady Grove’s unpaid or past due 
claims could be joined with those of the putative class could Shady 
 
provide prompt payments of uncontested medical bills. 
Shady Grove, 466 F.Supp.2d at 471 (italics of statute and regulations omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
 42. Id. at 470.  Galves was eventually dismissed as a party due to lack of standing because she 
had completely assigned the right to collect from Allstate to Shady Grove.  See id. at 473-74. 
 43. See id. at 469. 
 44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (stating federal diversity jurisdiction requires that matter in 
controversy exceed $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs and dispute be between “citizens of 
different states”).  A corporation is deemed a citizen of both its state of incorporation and “where it 
has its principal place of business.”  See § 1332(c).  Absent unusual circumstances, the principal 
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Grove meet the requisite jurisdictional amount.  But the putative class 
was large enough to encompass Illinois citizens, which would destroy 
the required complete diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and 
all defendants.45 
Because of the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”),46 passed by 
Congress as an attempt to respond to the perceived problem of collusive 
or abusive state court class actions,47 a class action such as that sought 
by Shady Grove was permitted even in the absence of complete 
diversity.  This allowed the exercise of federal court jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), so long as the case otherwise qualified 
as a class action.  Although claims such as the Galvez bill were small, 
when combined with those of other medical providers, the jurisdictional 
amount was easily met.  Shady Grove contended that the damages to the 
class from Allstate’s alleged slow pay subterfuge exceeded $5 million.48 
But in moving to dismiss, Allstate had two very strong cards to 
play—(1) New York’s class action law (§ 901(b)), which prohibits class 
actions that seek enforcement of a statutory penalty absent express 
authorization in the statute, which was lacking in Insurance Law § 5106, 
and (2) the Erie doctrine, which requires that federal courts sitting in 
diversity apply controlling state substantive law in the case, although 
they are obligated to apply federal procedural law.49  If, as alleged by 
 
 45. See Strawbridge et al. v. Curtiss et al., 7 U.S. 267 (1806) (establishing requirement of 
complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants); MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 
102.12[1] (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2010) (describing background and operation of complete diversity 
requirement). 
 46. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) and in other 
sections of Title 28. 
 47. See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 45, § 3705 (describing background and 
contents of CAFA); Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical 
Context:  A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008).  Describing the Act, Professor 
Burbank notes the problematic nature of the law and its potential for unintended consequences: 
[CAFA] resulted from years of intense lobbying (on both sides of the aisle by interest 
groups associated with both plaintiffs and defendants), partisan wrangling, and, 
following two successful filibusters, fragile compromises.  [CAFA marks] a sharp break 
from a nearly uniform history of congressional contraction of diversity jurisdiction.  The 
scope of putative class actions that, at the end of the day, the statute brings within the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts is very broad.  Those facts—coupled with 
the legislation’s place in a trio of “tort reform” measures sought by the Bush 
administration, and with unrelenting attacks on lawyers in general and plaintiffs’ lawyers 
in particular—help to understand why some critics regard the compromises as 
insufficient and the ultimate legislation as inimical to the interests of numerous groups of 
potential litigants. 
See id. at 1441 (footnotes omitted). 
 48. See Shady Grove, 466 F. Supp.2d at 469. 
 49. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing the Erie doctrine). 
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Allstate, § 901(b) was New York substantive law (despite being encased 
in a state procedural provision), the Shady Grove class action was barred 
in federal court just as it would be in New York’s state courts.  
Alternatively, if § 901(b) was a state rule of civil procedure, it was 
overridden or displaced by Federal 23, which contained no restriction on 
statutory penalty class actions of this type. 
If an alien from another planet were to land on Earth and be 
appraised of the Erie doctrine in sound bite fashion (in federal court 
diversity cases, federal procedure and state substantive law apply), a 
case like Shady Grove might seem deceptively easy.  The case was 
obviously in federal court, which has a comprehensive body of civil 
rules, including Federal Rule 23, which extensively regulates class 
actions.  The shortest way with the Erie question50 is simple application 
of Federal Rule 23 regardless of the underlying substantive content of 
any conflicting New York rules of civil procedure.  But with the possible 
exception of Erie itself,51 the Erie doctrine has never been simple.  
Distinguishing between procedure and substance can be difficult, 
particularly where a court is attempting to achieve the symmetry of state 
and federal outcomes sought in Erie and to avoid the type of unseemly 
federal-state forum shopping that motivated Justice Brandeis’s Erie 
opinion.52  In addition, there can be difficult questions as to the scope of 
 
 50. I use the phrase in homage to Max Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARV. L. REV. 
388 (1942), which urged a streamlined approach to statutory construction, albeit one I find 
incomplete and flawed, realizing that reasonable observers might think the same of the Shady Grove 
plurality opinion and my enthusiasm for it. 
 51. In Erie, a Pennsylvania plaintiff sued a New York-based railroad for injuries he suffered 
while walking along the footpath adjacent to one of its tracks in Pennsylvania.  Under Pennsylvania 
tort law, plaintiff Tompkins was considered a mere trespasser and owed no duty but the railroad’s 
refraining from inflicting intentional injury.  But under the federal common law of tort, which 
applied in federal diversity cases prior to Erie, plaintiff was a licensee permitted to use the footpath 
by custom and practice and was owed a duty of reasonable car by the defendant.  Erie itself thus 
presented a clear choice of different substantive rules of tort law.  No one contended that the 
trespasser/licensee distinction was procedural.  See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), 
overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 52. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 75 (describing the policy goal of change in Erie from prior rule of 
Swift v. Tyson was to harmonize applicable law and outcomes in similar cases in federal and state 
court and to discourage excessive forum shopping).  Justice Brandeis was particularly upset with 
pre-Erie cases such as Black and White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 
276 U.S. 518 (1928) in which a Kentucky cab company wished to enter into an exclusive 
arrangement with the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, also a Kentucky Corporation, giving it a 
monopoly on taxi service at the Bowling Green, Kentucky train station.  The cab company avoided 
the state’s prohibition on such an arrangement by re-incorporating in Tennessee and successfully 
sued in federal court for a declaratory judgment that the monopoly arrangement was permissible.  It 
succeeded due to the application of federal common law, which differed from Kentucky state law, 
to the contract.  See Erie, 304 U.S. at 73-75. 
15
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a procedural rule and the boundaries of its application.  Where the reach 
of a federal procedural rule ends, courts have metaphorically entered the 
territory of state substantive law. 
Beginning largely with Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York,53 
the Supreme Court focused on whether application of a federal civil rule 
or a state law would make a difference in the case outcome, holding in 
York itself that a state statute of limitations applied to bar a claim that 
was otherwise timely under federal procedural rules.54  Similarly, in 
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,55 the Court applied a 
Kansas requirement that a defendant be served with process within two 
years to bar a tort claim even though the action had been commenced in 
federal court prior to the expiration of the statute pursuant to Federal 
Rule 3.56  When a similar situation arose fifteen years later, the Court’s 
Hanna v. Plumer opinion surprised some observers and changed the 
contours of the Erie doctrine by applying Federal Rule 4, which 
permitted substituted service of process, rather than chapter 197, section 
9 of the General Laws of Massachusetts, which required that executors 
of estates be provided with in-hand personal service within a year in 
order to be timely, thus permitting in federal court a tort claim against a 
decedent’s estate that would have been barred in Massachusetts state 
court.57 
Hanna’s refinement of the Erie doctrine was to specifically 
establish two tracks of Erie analysis.  In one track were cases where 
there was an applicable Federal Civil Rule.  In such cases, the federal 
rule would govern58 unless the Rule exceeded the powers of rulemaking 
conferred in the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072,59 which 
 
 53. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
 54. Id. at 111. 
 55. Categorized Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,  337 U.S.530 (1949). 
 56. Id. at 533-34. 
 57. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-70 (1965). 
 58. Properly promulgated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have the force of statute and “laws 
in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”  
See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
 59. The Act gives the U.S. Supreme Court “power to prescribe general rules of practice and 
procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts . . . and courts of 
appeals.”  Rules are promulgated through a process in which an Advisory Committee on the Civil 
Rules, appointed by the Chief Justice, makes recommendations, which are in turn reviewed and 
approved by a Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and by the Judicial 
Conference of the United States and ultimately then promulgated by the Court, which submits the 
proposed Rule or Rules to Congress on or before May 1 of a given year.  If Congress does not alter, 
amend, or block a proposed Rule within 180 days, the Rule takes effect December 1.  See generally 
28 U.S.C. §§2073, 2074; Steven S. Gensler, Must, Should, Shall, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1139 (2010) 
(describing process of Rules amendments in the context of changes to FED. R. CIV. P. 56 that took 
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mandates that federal procedural rules “not abridge, enlarge or modify 
any substantive right.”60  In the absence of an on-point, valid, civil rule, 
the Court was left with the “relatively unguided” task of determining 
whether the state law at issue was sufficiently substantive in that its 
application was required by constitutionally based principles of 
federalism and Erie’s policy goals of avoiding, where possible, disparate 
outcomes in state and federal court as well as the discouragement of 
undue federal-state forum shopping.61 
Although Hanna strengthened the role of the Federal Rules, 
reinvigorating pro-Rules case law that had been somewhat forgotten, 
Hanna was not enough of a game changer to undo the 1949 Ragan 
ruling.  In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,62 the Court re-affirmed its 
commitment to Ragan and a narrow reading of Federal Rule 3 (as 
governing primarily issues of intra-federal court timing rather than 
required notice for purposes of statutes of limitation)63 and applied an 
Oklahoma law requiring service of process upon a defendant (rather than 
filing in court) within the prescribed state limitations period if a tort 
claim was to be timely and subject to litigation in federal court.64 
Thus, the Erie doctrine retained substantial clout that could prevent 
application of what to the uninitiated might seem like a simply matter of 
applying federal procedural rules.  Particularly strengthening Allstate’s 
case was Gasperini v. Center for the Humanities, Inc.,65 which required 
an application of New York CPLR § 5501 regarding judicial review of 
verdicts as to alleged excessiveness notwithstanding the presence of 
Federal Rule 59, which governs motions for new trials.  Because Rule 59 
does not expressly list the grounds and criteria for the grant of a new 
trial, the Gasperini Court found it not to be in conflict with the New 
York law in a 5-4 opinion displaying some sharp contrasts between 
Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion and Justice Scalia’s dissent.66 
 
effect Dec. 1, 2010); Steven Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 
(1982) (providing a comprehensive review of the Act). 
 60. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
 61. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.  See also id. at 466-67 (stating that York’s outcome 
determinative test was “never intended to serve as a talisman.”). 
 62. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
 63. See id. at 749-51 & 742. 
 64. See id. at 751-53. 
 65. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 66. Compare id. at 418 (Ginsburg majority opinion) (joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, 
Souter and Breyer) with id. at 448 (Scalia dissent) (joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and 
Justice Clarence Thomas).  See also id. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting on different grounds).  The 
distinctions in the Scalia and Stevens analyses presage and are similar to their jurisprudential 
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Against this backdrop, the Shady Grove trial court found Allstate’s 
argument against class certification persuasive,67 as did the Second 
Circuit.68  But a slim majority of the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, 
holding that Federal Rule 23 controlled the issue of class certification in 
federal court, overriding a contrary state court rule.  “Because the New 
York law attempts to answer the same question, but in a different way, 
i.e., stating that the suit may not be maintained as a class action because 
of the relief it seeks, the New York law must give way to the Federal 
Rule unless the Federal Rule is invalid.”69 
The Scalia plurality opinion followed Chief Justice Earl Warren’s 
methodology in Hanna and relied heavily on the seventy-year old 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc. decision70 that predated Guaranty Trust of 
 
conflict in Shady Grove.  See infra note 89-94 and accompanying text (describing their respective 
Shady Grove opinions). 
 67. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. et. al. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 466 F. Supp. 2d 467, 
472-73 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 68. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. et al. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 
2008) (unanimous decision of panel comprised of Judges Rosemary Pooler, opinion author, Jose 
Cabranes, and Robert Katzmann). 
 69. Allan Ides, Rule 23 Prevails Over New York Law Limiting Class Actions:  U.S. Supreme 
Court Construes The Rules Enabling Act, LEXSEE 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 5075 (May 25, 2010) 
(“The Court rejected the Second Circuit’s argument that Rule 23 and the New York law address 
different issues and, therefore, do not conflict.”).  Further summarizing the decision, Professor Ides 
noted that the Second Circuit had found no conflict by viewing FED. R. CIV. P. 23 as concerning 
only the criteria for deciding when a class may be certified while § 901(b) focused on the issue of 
whether the type of claim asserted was eligible for class action treatment. 
The Court rejected this distinction between eligibility and certifiability as “entirely 
artificial,” noting that both are preconditions for maintaining a class action.  The Court 
read Rule 23 as empowering a federal court to certify a class in each and every case in 
which the Rule’s criteria are met, so that any purported limitation on that power, such as 
the New York law’s prohibition on class actions seeking statutory penalties, necessarily 
conflicts with it. 
Id.     
 70. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).   
 
  The fundamental difficulty with both [concurrence and dissent] arguments is that the 
substantive nature of New York’s law, or its substantive purpose, makes no difference.  
A Federal Rule of Procedure is not valid in some jurisdictions and invalid in others – or 
valid in some cases and invalid in others – depending upon whether its effect is to 
frustrate a state substantive law (or a state procedural law enacted for substantive 
purposes).  That could not be clearer[than] in Sibbach:  [quoting Sibbach at length]. 
 
. . . . 
 
. . . We have held since Sibbach, and reaffirmed repeatedly, that the validity of a Federal 
Rule depends entirely upon whether it regulates procedure.  [citing Sibbach, Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-70 (1965), and Burlington N. R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 
(1987)].  If it does, it is authorized by § 2072 and is valid in all jurisdictions, with respect 
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New York v. York and its outcome determinative test.71  For the plurality, 
the finding of an applicable federal rule was nearly the end of the Erie 
inquiry:  if the federal rule is on point, it controls unless it violates the 
Enabling Act.  But if the federal rule is genuinely procedural, the 
safeguards of the Enabling Act process almost guaranty that the resulting 
rule does not violate the Act. 
   The framework for our decision is familiar.  We must first 
determine whether Rule 23 answers the question in dispute.  If it does, 
it governs—New York’s law notwithstanding—unless it exceeds 
statutory authorization or Congress’s rulemaking power.  We do not 
wade into Erie’s murky waters unless the federal rule is inapplicable or 
invalid. 
. . . . 
. . .[Federal Rule 23 by its terms] creates a categorical rule entitling a 
plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a 
class action. . . . Thus, Rule 23 provides a one-size-fits-all formula for 
deciding the class-action question.  Because § 901(b) attempts to 
answer the same question—i.e., it states that Shady Grove’s suit “may 
not be maintained as a class action” because of the relief it seeks—it 
cannot apply in diversity suits unless Rule 23 is ultra vires.72 
For the plurality, “the only criterion for validity under the [Rules 
Enabling Act] is whether the rule really regulates procedure, i.e., the 
judicial process of enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive 
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or 
infraction of them.”73  For Justice Scalia and the plurality, it was not 
 
to all claims, regardless of its incidental effect upon state-created rights.  
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010) (emphasis 
in original) (citations omitted). 
 71. See Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“The question is whether such a statute 
concerns merely the manner and the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, 
is enforced, or whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the aspect that alone is 
relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal 
court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the 
same parties in a State court?”); MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 45, § 62 (discussing 
York’s attempt to create consistent results regardless of whether a case arises in state court or federal 
court, but pointing out that the outcome determinative approach is ineffective because “it is difficult 
to conceive of any rule of procedure that cannot have a significant effect on the outcome of the 
case.”).  
 72. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (Scalia, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 73. Ides, supra note 69 (“If [the federal civil rule] governs only the manner and the means by 
which a litigant’s rights are enforced, it is valid; if it alters the rules of decision by which the court 
will adjudicate those rights, it is not.  Whether the rule will incidentally affect a litigant’s 
substantive rights, which most procedural rules do, is beside the point.”). 
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important whether § 901(b) reflected substantive state law or policy.  Its 
status as a state rule of procedure required that it take a back seat to an 
applicable federal rule. 
The plurality found no question that § 901(b) was procedural rather 
than substantive.  “Unlike a law that sets a ceiling on damages (or puts 
other remedies out of reach) in properly filed class actions, § 901(b) says 
nothing about what remedies a court may award; it prevents the class 
actions it covers from coming into existence at all.”74  Regardless of 
whether § 901(b) was pursuing state substantive policy rather than 
merely providing procedural ground rules, § 901(b) and Federal Rule 23 
“flatly contradict each other.”75  Regarding Enabling Act precedent 
about the validity of civil rules, Justice Scalia noted that the Court has 
“rejected every statutory challenge to a federal Rule that has come 
before us.”  Although [e]ach of these rules had some practical effect on 
the parties’ rights,” he emphasized that “each undeniably regulated only 
the process for enforcing those rights; none altered the rights themselves, 
the available remedies, or the rules of decision by which the court 
adjudicated either.”76 
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg, in an analysis similar to that of her 
Gasperini majority opinion, argued that § 901(b) was indeed an 
expression of New York substantive law, enacted to effect an important 
state policy.77  Under the dissent’s concept of Erie, the Court must be 
sensitive to such important state interests.78  In reaching the view that § 
901(b)’s limitation on statutory penalty class actions was such an 
important state interest, the dissent relied heavily on its view of the 
statute’s legislative history.79  As discussed in Part III, below, this view 
of the prohibition’s genesis was incomplete and arguably misleading in 
that § 901(b) looks at least as much as an ill-examined bit of interest 
group horse-trading as it does a considered expression of public policy 
 
 74. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1439 (footnote omitted). 
 75. See id. at 1441. 
 76. See id. at 1442-43 (citations omitted).  As the Court has consistently done, Justice Scalia 
categorized Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,  337 U.S. 530 (1949) and Walker v. 
Armco Steel Corp.,  446 U.S. 740 (1980) as cases in which the scope of the federal rule (FED. R. 
CIV. P. 3) was too narrow to conflict with the state rules in question (governing commencement of 
actions by service of process prior to the expiration of the applicable statutes of limitations). 
 77. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 78. See id. at 1460-65. 
 79. See id at 1463-64.  See also infra notes 80-81 & 150-52 and accompanying text 
(addressing completeness and accuracy of the dissent’s characterization of § 901(b)’s legislative 
history). 
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norms.80  A similar but less cheerleading view of § 901(b)’s derivation is 
reflected in the concurrence as well.81 
The Scalia plurality and the Ginsburg dissent each commanded four 
votes.  The Stevens concurrence broke the tie in favor of application of 
Federal Rule 23 over § 901(b).  At the end of this hotly litigated Erie 
question, five jurists sided with Federal Rule 23 (Justices Stevens, 
Roberts, Thomas, Sotomayor and Stevens) while eight (Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Kennedy and Alito as well as trial judge Nina 
Gershon and Second Circuit judges Rosemary Pooler, Jose Cabranes, 
and Robert Katzmann)82 preferred application of § 901(b).  Justice 
Stevens sided with the federal rule through a considerably more 
functionalist route, more jurisprudentially aligned with the Ginsburg 
dissent than the Scalia plurality in method if not result.83 
Justice Stevens, like the dissenters, was more concerned about 
being sensitive to state substantive law and policy and openly 
acknowledged the degree to which that law and policy may be encased 
in state procedural provisions.  Similarly, Justice Stevens acknowledged 
that the application of particular procedural rules often has substantive 
consequences and noted that the Court’s Erie precedents had often 
applied ostensibly procedural state laws and rules that had clear 
substantive impact in terms of affecting a litigant’s success in federal 
court litigation.  But to a greater degree than Justice Scalia in the 
plurality opinion, Justice Stevens sought to balance the state and federal 
interests presented in the case.84 
In Shady Grove, he found the balance to tip in favor of Federal 
Rule 23 in that New York had chosen to express its reservations about 
statutory penalty class actions in a state procedural rule.  Federal Rule 23 
governs class actions in federal court.  Under the Stevens examination of 
whether conflicting state procedural practice contains important state 
substantive law, it does not violate the Enabling Act.85  As such, § 
901(b) was New York’s statement about how its courts should deal with 
such matters, but was not enough of an expression by the state as to the 
absolute scope of state statutory remedies such as Insurance Law § 5106.  
Further, § 901(b) did not itself define state rights and remedies regarding 
 
 80. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text. 
 81. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1458-59. 
 82. See infra note 41 & 68 and accompanying text (discussing trial and appellate court history 
of Shady Grove). 
 83. See Shady Grove, 130 U.S. at 1448 (Steven, J., concurring). 
 84. See id. at 1448-54. 
 85. See id. at 1457-59. 
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the substantive issues presented in the Shady Grove litigation.86  
Although § 901(b) has aspects of a cap on damages, which Justice 
Stevens would have regarded as applicable controlling substantive law 
under Erie, New York did not adopt a cap but instead addressed its 
policy concerns only through a procedural rule.87  Under these 
circumstances, Justices Stevens as the key fifth vote was unwilling to 
require the ousting of federal procedural law by this type of state 
provision. 
Notwithstanding support from Justice Stevens on the merits and 
holding of the case, Justice Scalia could not resist severe criticism of the 
concurrence as an imprudent legal approach.  Part II.C. of Justice 
Scalia’s opinion (which Justice Sotomayor did not join, perhaps because 
it she viewed it as surplusage, perhaps because it seemed an almost ad 
hominem attack on the reasoning of a colleague providing a crucial vote, 
or perhaps because her own Erie approach is not as formalistically 
supportive of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when in conflict with 
state law), spends several pages attacking the Stevens approach to 
assessing the validity of a federal rule under the Enabling Act.88 
To perhaps oversimplify, Justice Scalia’s focus is whether an 
applicable federal rule “really regulates procedure” rather than setting 
forth substantive law encased in a procedural code.  If the rule in 
question is truly one of procedure (i.e., the methodology by which 
substantive claims are litigated), it is valid under the Enabling Act and 
applies notwithstanding contrary state law. 
We have long held that [the Enabling Act’s limitation that federal 
procedural rules not abridge, enlarge or modify substantive rights] 
means that the Rule must “really regulat[e] procedure—the judicial 
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law 
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or 
infraction of them.  The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant’s 
substantive rights; most procedural rules do.  What matters is what the 
rule itself regulates:  If it governs only “the manner and the means” by 
which the litigants’ rights are “enforced,” it is valid; if it alters “the 
rules of decision by which the court will adjudicate [those] rights,” it is 
not.89 
 
 86. See id.  
 87. See id. at 1458-59. 
 88. See id. at 1444-48. 
 89. See id. at 1442 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). 
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In contrast, Justice Stevens focuses more on the Enabling Act 
requirement that the federal procedural rule at issue not “abridge, 
enlarge, or modify any substantive right.”  If it does, it cannot overcome 
the state law or rule, no matter how procedural the federal rule’s 
function.  In Shady Grove, Justice Stevens found Federal Rule 23 not to 
have changed state substantive law.90  Notwithstanding plaintiff Shady 
Grove’s success in being allowed to seek class action status in federal 
court, insurance companies like Allstate and other defendants facing 
statutory penalties continue to enjoy their immunity from state court 
class actions. 
For Justice Scalia, the Stevens approach was unwise both because it 
deviated from the precedential simplicity of Sibbach and because it 
required a court to make a more sustained, time consuming, and 
potentially value-laden assessment of the relative importance of the 
conflicting state law rather than simply drawing a bright line between 
the procedural and the substantive.91  For Justice Stevens, the Scalia 
approach was an over-reading of Sibbach v. Wilson and was unfaithful to 
the command of the Enabling Act that the Court ensure that the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure not oust or negate state substantive law, which 
could occur even if the state statute or rule did not alter an otherwise 
applicable substantive rule or decision.92 
Despite occasionally snippy rhetoric in the Scalia and Stevens 
opinions,93 the practical consequences of their approaches are quite 
 
 90. See id. at 1456-60. 
 91. See id. at 1444-45 (“The concurrence would decide this case on the basis, not that Rule 23 
is procedural, but that the state law it displaces is procedural, in the sense that it does not “function 
as part of the State’s definition of substantive rights and remedies.”  A state procedural rule is not 
preempted, according to the concurrence, so long as it is “so bound up with,” or “sufficiently 
intertwined with,” a substantive state-law right or remedy “that it defines the scope of that 
substantive right or remedy,” . . . . This analysis squarely conflicts with Sibbach, which established 
the rule we apply.” (citations omitted)). 
 92. See id. at 1454-1455 (contending that plurality over-reads or over-extends Sibbach 
without sufficient sensitivity for Enabling Act requirement that judicially promulgated procedural 
rules not supplant state substantive law. 
 93. See, e.g., id. at 1445 (Scalia, J.) (“In reality, the concurrence seeks not to apply Sibbach, 
but to overrule it (or, what is the same, to rewrite it.”)); id. at 1446, n.11 (“The concurrence’s 
approach, however, is itself unfaithful to the statute’s terms” and “would allow States to force a 
wide array of parochial procedures on federal courts so long as they are ‘sufficiently intertwined 
with a state right or remedy”), id. at 1446 (“Why we should cast aside our decades-old decision 
escapes us, especially since (as the concurrence explains) that would not affect the result”), id. at 
1447 (“[T]he concurrence’s approach does nothing to diminish the difficulty [of drawing the line 
between procedure and substance], but rather magnifies it many times over.  Instead of a single hard 
question of whether a Federal Rule regulates substance or procedure, that approach will present 
hundreds of hard questions, forcing federal courts to assess the substantive or procedural character 
of countless state rules that may conflict with a single Federal Rule); id. at 1447, n.15 (“[The 
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similar and compatible. One advantage of the Scalia approach is its 
simplicity and relative ease of application.  Another is that it is less 
likely to result in the invalidation of federal rules, which result only after 
a considerable expenditure of effort by the legal community.  In the 
alternative, an advantage of the Stevens approach is that it provides for 
more problematic cases a means for striking down federal rules that 
seriously conflict with state substantive law and policy.94 
Shady Grove presents interesting and difficult questions about the 
scope of the Federal Civil Rules, deference to state law and policy, 
equivalence of federal and state litigation outcomes, forum shopping, 
and the jurisprudence of federalism as well as revisiting long-running 
concerns over the costs and benefits of class actions.  It also provides an 
interesting window on the jurisprudential preferences of the Justices.  
The case has spurred and will continue to spur substantial academic 
commentary95 and further litigation96 regarding the contours of the Erie 
doctrine. 
 
concurrence’s proposed] amorphous inquiry into the ‘nature and functions’ of a state law will tend 
to increase, rather than decrease the difficulty of classifying Federal Rules as substantive or 
procedural.  Walking through the concurrence’s application of its test to § 901(b) gives little reason 
to hope that its approach will lighten the burden for lower courts.” 
  See also id. at 1448, 1452-53 (Steven, J., concurring) (Justice Scalia believes that the sole 
Enabling Act question is whether the federal rule “really regulates procedure [as narrowly and 
perhaps glibly defined in the plurality opinion].  I respectfully disagree [observing in accompanying 
footnote 7 that “[t]his understanding of the Enabling Act has been the subject of substantial 
academic criticism, and rightfully so”) (citing sources)].  This interpretation of the Enabling Act is 
consonant with the Act’s first limitation to ‘general rules of practice and procedure,’ But it ignores 
the second limitation that such rules also ‘not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,” and 
in so doing ignores the balance that Congress struck between uniform rules of federal procedure and 
respect for a State’s construction of its own rights and remedies.  It also ignores the separation-of-
powers presumption and federalism presumption that counsel against judicially created rules 
displacing state substantive law.” (emphasis in original) (citations omitted)), id. at 1453, n.8 (Justice 
Scalia’s objection [to the concurrence contention that a state procedural code may really express 
state substantive law and policy] misses the key point.”); id. at 1453, n.9 (Justice Scalia’s response 
to concurrence argument “highlights how empty the plurality’s test really is” and invites undue 
“speculation” regarding congressional intent). 
 94. See Ides, supra note 19. 
 95. See, e.g., supra notes 17, 19, 20. 
 96. See, e.g., Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 1575 (2010) (putative Telephone Consumer 
Protection Act class action with certification initially denied by lower courts on grounds similar to 
trial court and Second Circuit rational in Shady Grove, remanded for further consideration in light 
of Supreme Court’s Shady Grove decision); Retained Realty, Inc. v. McCabe, 376 Fed. Appx. 52 
(2d Cir. 2010) (applying Shady Grove to Erie question in litigation); Pefanis v. Westway Diner, 
Inc., No. 08 Civ. 002 (DLC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93180 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 7, 2010) (same); 
Giovanniello v. ALM Media, No. 3:09cv1409 (JBA), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92181 (D. Conn. Sept. 
3, 2010) (same); Leyse v. Bank of Am., No. 09 Civ. 7654 (JGK), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58461 
(S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2010) (same); Leyse v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., et al., No. 1:09-CV-
237, 2010 U.S. Dist., Lexis 54103 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2010) (same). 
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An under-discussed aspect of both the decision and the doctrine, 
however, is the precise derivation and nature of § 901(b)’s limitation on 
certain types of class actions, its wisdom and impact, and the degree to 
which the Court’s different Erie approaches may encourage or frustrate 
reflective and transparent state lawmaking.  Although formalism has 
taken its share of blows in the academy and the courts, in the Erie 
context it may encourage sounder, more deliberative state lawmaking by 
limiting the degree to which relatively unexamined state law favorable to 
interest groups may be hidden in state procedural codes rather than 
openly discussed, debated, and decided as a matter of substantive law.  
Shady Grove itself provides an illustration in that the § 901(b) 
prohibition on statutory penalty class actions proves on closer 
examination than given by the Shady Grove courts (at all levels) to be 
more problematic and less worthy of judicial deference than first meets 
the eye. 
 
  See also Holster, 130 S. Ct. at 1576 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that Holster decision below was supported by adequate and independent state law ground 
not conflicting with FED. R. CIV. P. 23 and that vacating judgment below is error) (“I would spare 
the Court of Appeals the necessity of revisiting—and, presumably, reinstating—its TCPA-grounded 
ruling”); Holster v. Gatco, Inc., 618 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2010) (on remand, Second Circuit, as 
predicted by Justice Ginsburg, reaffirmed previous ruling on basis other than § 901(b) ban on 
statutory penalty class actions). 
  Regarding Shady Grove itself, the case continues after remand.  See 380 Fed. Appx. 96 
(2d Cir. 2010) (remanding case to trial court for further proceedings); No. 06-CV-1842 (NG) (JO), 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64492 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2010) (rejecting Allstate’s contention that claim 
is moot because insurer has paid the medical bill and statutory interest initially sought by Shady 
Grove, noting that this had occurred prior to U.S. Supreme Court’s decision and that Allstate did not 
at that time think the matter moot).  See id. at *3 (“[Allstate’s motion] plainly raises the question of 
why, if that payment mooted the case as Allstate now claims, it did not say so earlier but instead 
pursued complex litigation before the appellate court and then the Supreme Court.”).  At the risk of 
sounding cynical, one wonders why the Shady Grove dissenters were so interested in expending 
legal resources in a functional question to help this rather unattractive litigant accused of 
systematically chiseling auto accident victims and their medical providers.  Even if the facts alleged 
by plaintiff are incorrect, the Shady Grove case itself illustrates the arguable futility of individual 
imposition of statutory penalties to curb bad but profitable behavior by insurers and other 
economically powerful interests.  Simultaneously, Shady Grove calls into serious question the 
wisdom of § 901(b)’s ban on statutory penalty class actions. 
25
Stempel: Shady Grove
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
7-STEMPEL_44.4_8.7.11_DONE-9.2.11.DOC 9/12/2011  8:38 AM 
932 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:907 
III.  NEW YORK CLASS ACTION LAW AND ITS RESTRICTIONS ON 
ACTIONS SEEKING STATUTORY PENALTIES 
A. The Impetus for Class Action Reform in New York 
The Shady Grove story has roots arguably as old as 184997 and 
began in earnest in 1966, the year that far-reaching amendments to 
Federal Rule 23 effect.98  The 1966 amendments expanded the utility 
and potential for use of the class action device in federal courts, 
prompting many states to follow suit in the aftermath of the federal rules 
change.99  In what is now seen as perhaps excessive optimism over the 
potential of the class action to right wrongs, support for class actions by 
consumers and investors rocketed, leading to a wave of federal court 
litigation that, although later leading to second thoughts, did not 
generally inhibit enthusiasm for the class action device.  In the aftermath 
of the 1966 Amendment to Federal Rule 23, a generally pro-claimant 
law reform mentality held sway, one that included expanded discovery 
and access to information, a continued liberal attitude toward pleading, 
and expanding substantive rights for consumers, individuals and 
minorities.100  There eventually emerged fierce opposition to this 
movement as well as backlash against its perceived excesses, forces that 
during the ensuing 40 years would change the litigation picture 
dramatically.101 
 
 97. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1005 (predecessor to current state class action law at N.Y, C.P.L.R. § 
901 et seq.). 
 98. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 & advisory committee Note (1966), reprinted in FEDERAL RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 2010-2011 EDUCATION EDITION 126-31 (2010). 
 99. See JAMES, JR. ET AL., supra note 2, § 10.20 (describing history of class action litigation); 
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 
(1987) (detailing development of class action, including importance of 1966 Amendment to FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Class Actions and Limited Vision:  Opportunities for Improvement 
Through a More Functional Approach to Class Treatment of Disputes, 83 WASH. U. L. QTRLY 
1127, 1133-55 (2005) [hereinafter Stempel, Class Actions and Limited Vision] (reviewing 
development of modern federal class action). 
 100.  See Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights:  Myth, Reality, and 
the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979) (describing optimism in wake of 1966 
amendments displaced to some extent by excessive fear of large class actions, criticizing Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), which required expensive actual mailed notice to class 
members in Rule 23(b)(3) damages class action). 
 101.  See Stempel, Class Actions and Limited Vision, supra note 99 at 1128-32 (noting 
mounting criticisms of class actions from 1970s to almost fever pitch during 1990s and early 
twenty-first century); Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”:  Class Certification and Blackmail, 
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (noting opposition to class actions as extortive but assessing such 
contentions as exaggerated); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” 
Settlements in Class Actions:  Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377 (2000) (noting 
26
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As the 1970s began, the class action was riding high and enjoyed 
the esteem of courts, scholars, and public interest groups despite strong 
opposition from much of the business community.102  New York was 
something of a laggard in this trend.  Its class action law dated back to 
1849 and precluded class action treatment where a defendant’s allegedly 
wrongful conduct was not simultaneously directed at a discrete and 
relatively confined group.103  Class actions were impossible under New 
York law, at least as historically applied by the courts, even where the 
conduct was uniform (e.g., a standardized insurance policy, form 
 
similar assessment finding great criticism of class actions but deeming much of the criticism 
overblown or unfounded); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruption of the Class Action:  The New 
Technology of Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 851 (1995) (contending that despite the benefits of 
class actions in theory they are in practice often abusive). 
  Regarding the backlash against the rights revolution and access to the courts generally, see 
Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law:  The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81TEX. L. 
REV. 285 (2002); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Contracting Access to the Courts:  Myth or Reality?  Bane or 
Boon?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 965 (1998); Steven N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch 
It Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1155 (1993); Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal 
Science or Crumbling Construct?  Tends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 
BROOK. L. REV. 659 (1993); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith, Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 
U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986). 
 102. See, e.g., Adolf Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. 
REV. 609 (1971) (urging that New York adopt class action law similar to FED. R. CIV. P. 23); 
Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:  1966 Amendments of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1967) (expressing optimism about new FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23); Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure:  Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF. L. 
REV. 433 (1960) (advocating expansion of class actions availability). 
 103. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1005; Onofrio v. Playboy Club of N.Y., 205 N.E.2d 308 (N.Y. Ct. 
App. 1965) (holding class certification denied where patrons were each allegedly erroneously 
charged $25 fee); Hall v. Coburn Corp., 259 N.E.2d 720, 720-22 (N.Y. 1970) (holding certification 
denied for putative class alleging illegally small type in credit contracts despite standardized form 
nature of contracts; interest of class members insufficiently common where they engaged in 
different transactions involving same form); Soc’y Milion Athena, Inc. v. Nat’l Bank of Greece, 22 
N.E.2d 374, 377 (N.Y. 1939) (showing court’s refusal to certify a class of depositors seeking return 
of funds allegedly illegally received by bank on grounds depositors are insufficiently “united in 
interest:  in that “[n]one of them has any lien or interest, legal or equitable against the property 
transferred or against any other assets of defendants” and thus “have no joint or common interest in 
any fund.”).  But see Ray v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 316 N.E.2d 320, 321-23 (N.Y. 1974) 
(class certification permitted where putative class consisted of owners who were all holders of 
debentures benefited by the same trust and allegedly injured in the same manner by trustee 
wrongdoing).  See also Alfonso A. Narvaez, Local Veto Voted on OTB Parlors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
11, 1975, at 46 [hereinafter Narvaez, Local Veto Voted on OTB Parlors] (subsidiary reporting on 
“Class-Action Bill”) (“While current laws in New York State permit class actions in certain cases, 
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contract, or a nationwide policy) if the proposed plaintiff class was 
affected by the defendant’s conduct at different times and place.104 
This limitation placed New York class action law in the relative 
Dark Ages as compared to Federal Rule 23, which in turn created 
considerable pressure for modernization.  Consumer groups and 
progressives with substantial support in the judiciary argued for a new 
class action law.  Law professor Adolf Homburger, then Chair of the 
CPLR Committee of the New York State Judicial Conference, published 
an important article urging that New York amend its class action law to 
conform to the federal rule.105  The Administrative Board of the Judicial 
Conference, chaired by influential and prestigious Court of Appeals 
Judge Stanley Fuld, endorsed class action reform.106 
The Court of Appeals went on record in favor of reform, almost 
engaging in legal blackmail in Moore v. Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co.107  Plaintiff challenged the insurer’s refusal to pay for treatment by a 
psychologist under its group major medical insurance policy covering 
state employees, contending that the policy’s limitation to reimbursing 
 
 104. See Letter from New York City Mayor Abraham D. Beame (by Legislative Representative 
Reinard E. Yousiven) to Gov. Hugh L. Carey (June 2, 1975) (praising eventual enactment of class 
action legislation and criticizing old New York law by noting:  “If a thousand consumers are 
defrauded and all sign the very same piece of paper, one may sue for the benefit of all, but if they 
sign one thousand identical standard form contracts, they lack the requisite unity of interest.  This 
renders the class action statute illusory for many consumers.  The proposed class action bill 
eliminated the unity of interest requirement and thus provides the consumer with a practical 
remedy.”).  See, e.g., Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 307 N.E.2d 554 (N.Y. 1973). 
 105. See Homburger, supra note 102; Weinstein, supra note 102 (advocating expansion of 
class actions availability.  In addition, Columbia Law Professors Jack Greenberg and Philip Schrag 
and others had been pushing for class action reform in litigation as well as in articles.  See, e.g., 
Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (attempting large class 
action for Truth in Lending violations but certification denied on grounds it would create 
excessively coercive pressure on defendants); see also Schrag & Meltsner, Class Action:  A Way to 
Beat the Bureaucracies Without Increasing Them, THE WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1972, at 55; 
Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Protection, 
114 U. PA. L. REV. 395 (1966) (cited in Memorandum of June 10, 1975 from Keneth P. Norwick, 
Legislative Dir., N.Y. Civil Liberties Union to Judah Gribetz, Governor’s Counsel in support of 
class action legislation after passage while awaiting gubernatorial signature) (at pp. 1-2).  Similar 
articles favoring expanded class action availability were cited in Memorandum of May 29, 1975 
from the State Consumer Protection Board to Counsel to the Governor at p. 5, n.18 (citing Resnikoff 
& Shrag, Pending State Class-Action Legislation, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 14, 1974, p. 1 and Shrag & 
Ratner, Caveat Emptor—Empty Coffer:  The Bankruptcy Law Has Nothing to Offer, 72 COLUM, L. 
REV. 1147, 1148, 1169-72 (1972). 
 106. See Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 2007) (noting judicial 
conference support of class action law).  Court of Appeals Judge Stanley Fuld was a highly regarded 
jurist, with a pro-business reputation.  See Sidney H. Stein, Stanley H. Fuld:  A Life Lived in the 
Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 258 (2004). 
 107. 307 N.E.2d 554 (N.Y. 1973). 
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services only if provided by medical doctors had been nullified by 
statute.  The court found the imposition of coverage valid, but denied 
class action treatment pursuant to CPLR § 1005 and applicable 
precedent despite misgivings about continuing along this course of stare 
decisis. 
The court is also aware that there was pending before the Legislature 
last year and will be again this year a comprehensive proposal to 
provide a broadened scope and a more liberal procedure for class 
actions, an objective shared by members of this court.  (See Senate 
Bill, No, 8544 [1972]; Assembly Bill, No. 10448 [1972].)  Because the 
proposed statute would assure limitations and safeguards which would 
be highly desirable in broadening the jurisdiction of the courts of this 
State over class actions, legislation in this area is highly preferable to 
the alternative of judicial development in the same direction.  In our 
view there is urgency for early legislation to accomplish these 
purposes, in light of the general and judicial dissatisfaction with the 
existing restriction on class actions which in many instances may mean 
a total lack of remedy, as a practical matter, for wrongs demanding 
correction.108 
The lone dissenter in Moore, Judge Sol Wachtler, a Long Island 
Republican, then a star on the judicial and political horizon,109 argued 
that the court should forgo waiting for an unpredictable legislature and 
enter the modern era of class action legislation via common law 
decision-making: 
[T]his class should be certified.  As noted by the majority, “the 
restrictive interpretation in the past of CPLR § 1005 and its 
predecessor statute no longer has the viability it may once have had.”  
Remembering that those restrictive interpretations were a product of 
this court, it would seem most appropriate that this court, recognizing 
the need for a broadened and more liberal procedure for class actions, 
should take the initiative in that direction.110 
The early efforts to which the Moore Court alluded had foundered 
due to the resistance of Republicans, who then controlled the State 
 
 108. See id. at 558. 
 109. In an astoundingly ironic and sad story, Judge Wachtler eventually was convicted and 
incarcerated as a result of harassing a former paramour in a notorious case of obsessive love gone 
bad.  He survived a stabbing in prison and was eventually released but, as might be expected, did 
not return to public life or legal prominence.  See SOL WACHTLER, AFTER THE MADNESS ( 1997); 
LINDA WOLFE, DOUBLE LIFE (1994); JOHN M. CAHER, KING OF THE MOUNTAIN:  THE RISE, FALL, 
AND REDEMPTION OF CHIEF JUDGE SOL WACHTLER (1998). 
 110. See Moore, 307 N.E.2d at 558 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). 
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Assembly and State Senate, as well as due to the shadow of then-
governor Malcolm Wilson, a Republican who was likely to veto any 
class action bill.111  Republican legislators identified with the concerns 
of retailers, insurers, and bankers, who dreaded the thought of class 
action litigation creating significant legal costs and potential liability due 
to modest overcharges or improprieties.112 
Although the Moore opinion’s call to action put some additional 
wind in the sails of reformers and resulted in a significant effort to enact 
a modern class action law during the 1974 legislative session, the same 
political factors remained at work.  Governor Wilson and the Republican 
leadership again prevented passage, albeit in part through the procedural 
gambit of barring a printing of the proposed bill so that it could not be 
brought before the full Assembly for consideration.113  Then came the 
November 1974 elections where, as elsewhere, the Nixon 
Administration’s Watergate scandal, culminating in President Richard 
Nixon’s August 1974 resignation and new President Gerald Ford’s 
unpopular pardon of Nixon, fueled substantial Democratic gains across 
the country.114  In New York, this meant a Democratic takeover of the 
 
 111. See Linda Greenhouse, Passage Seen for a Class-Action Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1975, 
at 290 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Passage Seen for a Class-Action Bill] (“Last year, a strong class-
action bill died in both houses of the Legislature without reaching the floor, after intense lobbying 
by banking and business groups.  [Republican] Governor [Malcom] Wilson made no secret of his 
dislike for the concept, and [Republican] Senator H. Douglas Barclay, chairman of the Senate Codes 
Committee, where the strong bill was assigned, countered it with a version of his own that consumer 
groups denounced as worse than no bill at all. . . . Governor Carey urged the passage of a class-
action bill . . ..”) (noting significant support for bill from some Republican legislators); Linda 
Greenhouse, Class Action, and How It Came to Nothing in Albany, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1974, at 
187 [hereinafter Greenhouse, How It Came to Nothing in Albany, N.Y.] (discussing politics of class 
action legislative proposal, including Democratic support and Republican opposition.  “What 
happened to the bill is ‘a classic study of what real lobbying is all about,’ in the words of James T. 
Prendergast, a lawyer who lobbied on the losing side for consumer assembly.”); James Klurfeld, 
Lobbyist Campaign Stalls Consumer Bill in Albany, THE HERALD STATESMAN (Watertown, N.Y.), 
Apr. 13, 1974, at 1; Linda Greenhouse, Consumers’ Class-Action Bill Argued, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 
1974, at 33 [hereinafter Greenhouse, Consumers’ Class-Action Bill Argued] (noting academic 
proponents of class action similar to FED. R. CIV. P. 23 and resistance or opposition by Republican 
legislators and business groups). 
 112. See supra note 111. 
 113. See Greenhouse, Consumers’ Class-Action Bill Argued, supra note 111, at 33. 
 114. See Laura Kalman, Gerald Ford, the Nixon Pardon, and the Rise of the Right, 58 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 349 (2010) (describing Watergate-related upheavals of 1974 politics); Joseph A. 
McCartin, Unexpected Convergence:  Values, Assumptions, and the Right to Strike in Public and 
Private Sectors, 1945-2005, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 727 (2009 ) (describing huge Democratic victory in 
Watergate-influenced elections of 1974); J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act, 1965-2007, 86 TEX. L. REV. 667, 705 (2008) (referring to “Democratic 
sweep in the 1974 ‘Watergate election’”); David S. Law & Lawrence Solum, Positive Political 
Theory and the Law:  Judicial Selection, Appointments Gridlock, and the Nuclear Option, 15 J. 
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Assembly and Senate and the replacement of Wilson with liberal 
Democrat Hugh Carey as governor.115 
B. The Path of Class Action Legislation and the Derivation of CPLR § 
901(b)’s Limitation on Penalty Class Actions 
Class action reform suddenly had renewed momentum.  Proponents 
reintroduced legislation in the 1975 session, putting forth a bill that 
would largely adopt the federal model.116  However, in some ways the 
proposed New York law was even more plaintiff and class treatment 
friendly than Federal Rule 23 in that it contained a relaxed provision 
regarding notice in actions seeking payment of damages to class 
members Federal Rule 23(b)(3) (class actions in federal jargon), 
allowing the judge to dispense with the inconvenience and expense of 
mailing individualized notice to class members.117  As before, the 1975 
proposal had widespread support from the academy, the judiciary, 
consumer groups, and political liberals.  Opposition predictably came 
from political conservatives and business interests and perhaps 
surprisingly from some elements of the organized bar who saw the 
coercive impact of the class device as outweighing its ability to help 
society’s “little guys” from righting little wrongs perpetrated profitably 
en mass by commercial entities.118 
 
CONTEMP. LEG. ISSUES 51, 83 (2006) (same); David R. LaGassee, Note, Undue Influence:  
Corporate Political Speech, Power and the Initiative Process, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1347, 1356 
(1995) (noting that the 1974 election big was a win for liberal reformers). 
 115. See Betsy Buechner, Consumer Groups Seek Big Albany Gains, THE HERALD 
STATESMAN (Watertown, N.Y.), Jan. 10, 1975, at 23 [hereinafter Buechner, Consumer Groups See 
Big Albany Gains] (noting shift to Democratic control of legislature and replacement of Republican 
Wilson with Democrat Carey was seen as positive by consumer groups seeking to enact class action 
bill and other pro-consumer legislation).  See also Alfonso A. Narvaez, Bill to Aid Consumer Suits 
Passed by the Legislature, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1975, at 39 [hereinafter Narvaez, Bill to Aid 
Consumer Suits Passed by the Legislature] (noting support for bill among consumer, liberal, and 
Democratic constituencies and opposition in Republican, business, and conservative quarters. 
 116. See sources cited in supra note 111. 
 117. See Greenhouse, How It Came to Nothing in Albany, N.Y., supra note 111, at 290 (noting 
relaxed notice requirements of original bill and revised bill providing for greater notice but court 
discretion in application); Greenhouse, Consumers’ Class-Action Bill Argued, at 33 (noting that 
conservative alternative to original bill offered by prominent Republican Senator would “for 
example, require all potential members of the class to be notified of the lawsuit and would require 
each plaintiff to show that he had suffered damages before he could share in the judgment”). 
 118. See articles cited in supra notes 111-18.  There historically has been some division of bar 
organizations in New York.  The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, headquartered in 
Midtown Manhattan, is heavily comprised, as its name implies, of urban practitioners.  In addition, 
many or most of the members and the bulk of the leadership is comprised of lawyers in prestigious 
commercial firms or alumni of such firms.  It is commonly described as the “Ivy League” bar, the 
“white shoe” bar or the “liberal establishment” in that it tends to be more politically liberal, 
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Assembly Speaker Stanley Fink, a Brooklyn Democrat, was lead 
sponsor of the bill, joined by more than fifty co-sponsors.119  It passed 
the Assembly (by a 138 to 5 vote) on February 10, 1975.120  The Senate 
returned the bill for reconsideration in May, where the amended 
legislation was again passed (by a vote of 146 to 0)121 and processed 
through the Senate, reaching final enactment on May 28.122  After 
transmittal to the governor, the bill was signed into law on June 17, 
1975.123  The resulting product was a state class action provision that 
looks like Federal Rule 23, but with a limitation on actions seeking 
penalties.  The process by which the final bill and this limitation 
emerged provides an additional window on the federal-state tussle 
reflected in Shady Grove. 
Despite pushback from bill opponents, which resulted in § 901(b)’s 
limitation on class actions enforcing statutory penalties, the resulting 
legislation was still arguably more pro-plaintiff, pro-class, and “liberal” 
than Federal Rule 23.  As noted in the Attorney General’s Memorandum 
to Governor Carey regarding the bill, 
Section 904 gives the court great discretion in determining the content 
and method of notice to the class and also permits the court to hold 
preliminary hearings in order to determine how the costs [of] notice 
need not be given in class actions brought primarily for injunctive or 
declaratory relief (where the plaintiff is in essence acting as a “private 
attorney general”).  Section 904 also gives the court discretion to allow 
the prevailing party the expenses of notice as taxable disbursements 
under 904 for the discretionary award of attorneys’ fees to the people 
 
academic in orientation, and national or international in its focus than the New York State Bar 
(headquartered in Albany), whose membership and leadership reflect considerably more upstate, 
small town and suburban roots as well a more conservative, pro-business focus.  See JEFFREY B. 
MORRIS, MAKING SURE WE ARE TRUE TO OUR FOUNDERS:  THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE 
CITY OF NEW YORK 1970-95 (1997).  For example, the City Bar publically opposed the nomination 
of conservative D.C. Circuit Judge and former Yale and Chicago law professor Robert Bork.  See 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking:  Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. 
L. REV. 529, 632, n.473 (2001); Linda Greenhouse, The Bork Hearings:  Legal Establishment 
Divided Over Bork Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1987, at 33.  See also MICHAEL PERTSCHUK 
& WENDY SCHAETZEL, THE PEOPLE RISING:  THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BORK NOMINATION 
(1989). 
 119. See Assembly Bill 1252-B, addressed in New York Legislative Service, Inc., NYLS 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ch. 207 (1975) [hereinafter NYLS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (on file with 
author) (including Governor’s Bill Jacket).  Fink continued in the legislature for nearly another 
twenty years, rising to become speaker and becoming one of New York’s most powerful politicians. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. 
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with small individual damages and poor financial resources to make 
greater use of the class action in order to redress common class 
injuries.124 
Although federal courts have the discretionary power to achieve 
similar results, both the language of current Federal Rule 23 and long-
standing interpretation of the 1966 version of the Rule that inspired the 
New York law, create a strong presumption that individual notice to 
class members is required in Federal Rule 23(b)(3) damages class 
actions, with plaintiff bearing responsibility for the costs of notice, at 
least in first instance.125  Governor Carey was made quite aware of this 
by his Attorney General: 
Not only does the bill now make class action procedures in New York 
similar to the federal procedures, its treatment of the issue of notice 
avoids the problems that continue to beset federal practice as a result 
of last year’s U.S. Supreme Court decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156. 
   I have advocated revision of the class action statute in this fashion 
for many years, having submitted a brief to the New York State Court 
of Appeals in 1969 as amicus curiae in the case of Hall v. Coburn, 226 
N.Y.2d 396.  My amicus curiae brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
Eisen case supported the same treatment of notice as that provided by 
this bill.126 
Nowhere in his memorandum assessing the bill does the Attorney 
General mention § 901(b)’s prohibition on class actions regarding 
statutory penalties.  Similarly, the Memorandum of the Governor filed 
with the Assembly makes no mention of the limitation on statutory 
penalty class actions.127  Neither does the Lieutenant Governor’s 
Counsel’s Memorandum to the Governor’s Counsel.128  In general, the 
bill was presented upon passage as an unalloyed good but described only 
in general terms, with little or no discussion of the areas in which the 
 
 124. Memorandum for the Governor [Hugh Carey] of Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz 
(June 4, 1975), at 1-2 (on file with author). 
 125. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).  See also 
Miller, supra note 100. 
 126. See Memorandum for the Governor, supra note 124, at 2 (underlining in original). 
 127. See Memorandum filed with Assembly Bill Number 1252-B (date not included on 
memorandum), signed by Governor Hugh Carey, available in “Bill Jacket” for the class action law.  
See NYLS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 119, ch. 207 (page 9 of compilation). 
 128. See Memorandum from Robert J. Dryfoos, Counsel to the Lieutenant Governor to Judah 
Gribetz, Counsel to the Governor (June 9, 1975) (on file with author). 
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original proposal had been cut back to accommodate business interest 
groups.129 
But, as with all legislation, there was a backstory in which interests 
opposing the bill pushed back, with mixed success in the matter of class 
action legislation.  During the 1974 legislative session during which the 
proposal died and the 1975 session leading to passage, debate over the 
class action bill was confined to the overall merits of aggregation in the 
abstract, i.e., whether permitting collective claims was in itself a wise 
idea empowering those suffering little wrongs or a foolish idea enabling 
voracious plaintiffs’ lawyers to extort businesses over minor errors.130  
In addition, there was public discussion of the means of measuring 
damages in class action matters, in particular whether “fluid” recovery 
or market share liability concepts could be used to compensate plaintiffs 
in cases where it was difficult or impossible to determine the identity of 
those wronged by an improper business practice.131 
 
 129. See, e.g., Letter from Assemblyman Stanley Fink to Judah Gribetz, Governor’s Counsel 
(June 2, 1975) (on file with author) (making no mention of limitation on class actions for statutory 
penalties or derivation of the restriction); Memorandum from State Consumer Protection Board to 
Governor’s Counsel (May 29, 1975) (on file with author) (describing new law as “based largely on 
the procedure used in federal class actions” but an “improve[ment] on the federal procedure”:  in 
that it avoids the Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin jurisprudence by authorizing notices by publication 
and “permits random sampling of the class to determine the need for individual notice, allows the 
court to require the defendant to pay for part or all of the costs of notice, and permits the court to 
hold a preliminary hearing on the merits to determine how the costs of notice should be 
apportioned.” (endnote omitted)).  The Consumer Protection Board Memorandum, supra, addresses 
§ 901[b] simply by summarizing it and arguably understates its limiting effect, noting that “of 
course, if the members of a class who would be entitled to a penalty sue only for their actual 
damages, they may do so in a class action,” an observation that tends to overlook the difficulties of 
proof and possibly low incentive to sue even with the benefit of the class action device. 
 130. See articles cited in supra notes 111-18. 
 131. See Linda Greenhouse, State Senate Unit Expected to Recommend New Bill Allowing 
Class-Action Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1974, at 13 [hereinafter Greenhouse, State Senate Unit 
Expected to Recommend New Bill Allowing Class-Action Suits].  “Fluid recovery” as the term was 
used in press accounts envisions a situation in which it is clear that consumers were harmed by 
wrongdoing but under circumstances where there was no paper trail and where it was unlikely or 
unwieldy for consumers to come forward and demonstrate their participation in the wrongful 
transactions.  The example used was of a cab company with a meter that charged excessive rates.  
Because most passengers then usually paid cash, identifying and notifying those harmed was 
difficulty, expensive, or perhaps impossible.  The passengers themselves would be unlikely to 
realize that they had been swindled absent notice.  The fluid recovery damages solution would 
require the taxi company to reduce its charges going forward until the amount of the overcharges 
had been repaid to the company’s patrons.  See id.  I analogize this form of recovery for the group to 
market share liability in tort law in which a plaintiff harmed by a product made by several 
manufactures may obtain proportional repayment according to the defendants’ market share when 
the plaintiff is unable to identify the specific drug or blasting cap that caused injury.  See, e.g., Hall 
v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (Weinstein, J.) (blasting 
caps); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (DES pharmaceutical product). 
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One might consider Section § 901(b)’s ban on class actions for 
statutory penalties to be a subset of the larger debate over aggregation 
generally.  Nonetheless, it appears that there was not a single mention of 
this limitation, proposed by opponents of the bill seeking to salve the 
pain of defeat, in any popular press reports—during either 1974 or 
1975—regarding class action legislation and the public policy issues 
surrounding the legislation.132  In other words, even politically interested 
laypersons outside the immediate circle of legislating likely had no idea 
that the original bill contained no such limitation and that the restriction 
came about silently and without any serious debate over the matter by 
political elites. 
Proposals to carve out statutory penalty litigation from the new 
class action law began to surface during spring 1975 as various interest 
groups registered their expected opposition.  The New York State Bar 
Association, in expressing its “disapproval” of the bill, as it had done 
with similar predecessor legislation, stated that § 901 regarding 
“prerequisites to a class action” should “contain a separate subdivision 
(b)” that would read: 
 
 132. See, e.g., Greenhouse, Consumers’ Class-Action Bill Argued, supra note 111, at 33; 
Consumers’ Groups Attack Barclay ‘Class-Action’ Bill, WATERTOWN DAILY TIMES, Mar. 11, 1974, 
at 9; Linda Greenhouse, State Senate Unit Expected to Recommend New Bill Allowing Class-Action 
Suits, supra note 131; Barclay Commends Public Service Department at Recognition Dinner, THE 
TRIBUNE-PRESS (Gouverneur, N.Y.), Apr. 10, 1974, at 1; Klurfeld, supra note 111, at 1; Class 
Action Law Unlikely This Year, WATERTOWN DAILY TIMES, Apr. 30, 1974, at 16; Class Action Law 
Dies in Albany, ADIRONDACK DAILY ENTERPRISE (Saranac Lake, N.Y.), May 1, 1974, at 5; 
Greenhouse, Class Action, and How It Came to Nothing in Albany, supra note 111, at 187; 
Candidates Heat Up Campaigning, The Daily Press, Oct. 26, 1974, at 17; Betsy Buechner, Albany 
Warming to Consumer Activists, THE OBSERVER-DISPATCH (Utica, N.Y.), Jan. 9, 1975, at 23; 
Buechner, Consumer Groups Seek Big Albany Gains, supra note 115, at 17; Senator Reintroduces 
Class Action Measure, WATERTOWN DAILY TIMES, Jan. 21, 1975, at 11; Greenhouse, Passage Seen 
for a Class-Action Bill, supra note 111, at 29; Narvaez, Local Veto Voted on OTB Parlors, supra 
note 103, at 46; Class-Action Suit Bill Gets Assembly OK, PRESS-REPUBLICAN, Feb. 11, 1975, at 25; 
Assembly Approves New Consumer Aid, THE HERALD STATESMAN (Yonkers, N.Y.), Feb. 11, 1975, 
at 2; Assembly Passes Consumer-Protection Bill, Utica NY DAILY PRESS, Feb. 11, 1975; David 
Shaffer, Assembly Passes by 140-5 Vote Key Consumer-Protection Bill, SCHENECTADY GAZETTE, 
Feb. 11, 1975, at 44; Paul Harenberg, Hometown Report, SUFFOLK COUNTY NEWS, Feb. 27, 1975, 
at 13; Narvaez, Bill to Aid Consumer Suits Passed by the Legislature, supra note 115, at 39; Paul J. 
Browne, Class Action Bill Passed by Senate, WATERTOWN DAILY TIMES, May 29, 1975, at 11; 
Christine McKnight, Consumer Legislation an Exception in Divided House, UTICA NY DAILY 
PRESS, 1975; Carey Okay Predicted for ‘Class Action Bill’, THE CITIZEN-ADVERTISER (Auburn, 
N.Y.), May 29, 1975, at 2; Legislature Passes ‘Class Action’ Bill, ADIRONDACK DAILY ENTERPRISE 
(Saranac Lake, N.Y.), June 2, 1975, at 2; Paul Harenberg, Hometown Report, SUFFOLK COUNTY 
NEWS, June 5, 1975, at 17; Milton Hoffman, Albany Legislation:  Lot Getting Done, THE HERALD 
STATESMAN (Yonkers, N.Y.), June 25, 1975; State Legislature Leaves ‘Slim’ Legacy, THE 
OBSERVER-DISPATCH (Utica, N.Y.), July 13, 1975, at 2A; Benjamin P. Roosa Jr., Assembly Report, 
THE HARLEM VALLEY TIMES, Sept. 4, 1975, at 4. 
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Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, forfeiture or minimum 
measure of recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in a 
class action, an action to recover a penalty, forfeiture or minimum 
measure of recovery created or imposed by statue may not be 
maintained as a class action.133 
The rationale for the Bar’s position was that New York law 
Contains many “penalty” and similar provisions establishing arbitrary 
measures of liability for noncompliance which, although appropriate 
for individual actions, would lead to excessively harsh results in large 
class actions.  The amounts of those penalties were established at 
levels sufficient to provide incentives for individual suits and it would 
be a gross distortion of their purpose to permit their recovery in class 
suits.134 
Other business-affiliated interest groups also supported the 
statutory penalty carve out as a means of making the class action more 
palatable, although none offered to support the legislation in return for 
the limit on statutory penalty class actions.135  Simultaneously, groups 
 
 133. See N. Y. State Bar Assoc. Comm. on Banking Law, Business Law and Civil Practice 
Law and Rules, Legislative Report No. 15 (1975) (on file with author) (regarding S.1309 (proposed 
by Barclay), A. 1252 (proposed by Fink), A1417 (proposed by Jonas); S. 1360 (proposed by 
Dunne), A. 1330 (proposed by Fink), S. 1251 (proposed by Dunne) (undated), at 2) (all various 
forms of the essentially similar class action bill favored by consumer groups)).  Accord N.Y. State 
Bar Association Committees on Banking Law, Business Law Legislative Report No. 4 (Apr. 7, 
1975) (on file with author); N.Y. State Bar Association Committees on Banking Law, Legislative 
Report No. 1 (undated) (on file with author). 
 134. N. Y. State Bar Assoc. Legislative Report No. 15 (1975) (on file with author) (regarding 
S.1309 (proposed by Barclay), A. 1252 (proposed by Fink), A1417 (proposed by Jonas), S. 1360 
(proposed by Dunne), A. 1330 (proposed by Fink), S. 1251 (proposed by Dunne), at 2 (all various 
forms of the essentially similar class action bill favored by consumer groups)) (transmitted via 
Letter of June 5, 1975 from John I. Vanderploog, Legislative Representative, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n 
to Judah Gribetz).  See also materials adjacent to Letter from Donald A. Walsh, Counsel, N.Y. 
Conference of Mayors and Municipal Officials to Judah Gribetz (June 16, 1975) (on file with 
author) in legislative history, stating: 
Penalties make it worthwhile for people to pursue their rights in court, and costly for 
defendants to violate the law.  Class actions do the same thing.  When lumped together, 
penalties and class actions produce overkill by magnifying potential liability wildly out 
of proportion to any possible wrong.  In one case a defendant was asked to pay $130 
million dollars for a violation which the judge called debatable and which caused no 
actual damages to anybody. 
Id. 
 135.  See, e.g., Letter from Sanford H. Bolz, General Counsel, Empire State Chamber of 
Commerce, to Judah Gribetz, Governor’s Counsel (June 4, 1975) and accompanying Memorandum 
in Opposition to A. 1252 (proposed by Fink) and S. 1309 (proposed by Barclay), at 3 [hereinafter 
Bolz Letter of June 4, 1975] (on file with author) (contending that “Recovery of Penalties Should 
Be Prohibited”).  See also Letter from Donald A. Walsh, Counsel, N.Y. Conference of Mayors and 
Mun. Officials to Judah Gribetz (June 16, 1975) (on file with author) (criticizing “vague” language 
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supporting the bill registered their approval of the legislation but did not 
comment on the issue of limits on statutory penalty class actions.136  In 
 
and “wide-open approach” of bill and expressing fear of “rash of suits” interfering with municipal 
actions but making no specific mention of statutory penalties); Letter from Welles A. Gray, 
Legislative Representative, Associated Credit Bureaus of N.Y. State and N.Y. Unit, American 
Collectors Assoc., to Judah Gribetz, Governor’s Counsel (June 9 1975) (on file with author) 
(attacking several aspects of bill but making no mention of statutory penalties); Letter from 
Clarence E. Galston, Exec. Vice President, Assoc. of N.Y. State Life Ins. Co., to Judah Gribetz, 
Governor’s Counsel (June 5, 1975), at 1 (on file with author) (opposing bill because of failure to 
limit recovery to “actual damages sustained by identifiable people” but failing to address issues of 
penalty class actions); Letter from Gary J. Perkinson, Executive Dir., N.Y. State Council of Retail 
Merch., Inc. to Judah Gribetz (June 4, 1975) (on file with author); Letter from Joseph R. Shaw, 
President, Associated Indust. of N.Y. State, Inc., to Judah Gribetz, Governor’s Counsel (June 3, 
1975) (on file with author) (expressing general opposition to class action law without specific 
discussion of § 901[b]); Memorandum to the Legislature, N.Y. Chamber of Commerce & Indust. 
(Feb. 3, 1975) (on file with author) (opposing bill in general as permitting “legalized blackmail” but 
making no specific mention of statutory penalties). 
  In his letter, Chamber of Commerce Counsel Bolz made clear that the Chamber opposed 
the class action bill even with the inclusion of the penalty limitation: 
Of the six reasonable amendments which we, along with the New York State Council of 
Retail Merchants and a combination of three committees of the New York State Bar 
Association, suggested that would make the bill acceptable, four were ignored.  Only (1) 
a ban on recovery of statutory penalties was adopted—and only a feeble pass was made 
at (2) an essential limitation on attorneys’ fees—by limiting them to the “reasonable 
value of the legal services rendered” instead of, as we urged to “the number of hours 
reasonably expended . . . at a fair hourly rate.”  Beyond that, there was no concession 
made to our further requests for (3) individual notice to reasonably identifiable members 
of the class in damage cases, (4) notice expenses to be borne by plaintiffs except in 
extraordinary circumstances, (5) limitation of recoveries to actual damages sustained by 
identifiable people and not “fluid recoveries,” and (6) discretion to the judge to 
determine whether class members should be required to assent to be included (“opt-in”) 
or be included unless they signify dissent (“opt-out”). 
See Bolz Letter of June 4, 1975, supra, at 1. 
 136. See, e.g., Memorandum from Keneth P. Norwick, Legislative Dir., N.Y. Civil Liberties 
Union to Judah Gribetz (June 19, 1975) (on file with author); Letter from Joseph T. Weingold, 
Exec. Dir., N. Y. State Assoc. for Retarded Children, to Judah Gribetz, Governor’s Counsel (June 9, 
1975) (on file with author); Telegram from Abraham Fuchsberg, Chair, Legislative Comm., N.Y. 
State Trial Lawyers Assoc. (June 6, 1975) (on file with author); Letter from Stephen Shestakofsky, 
Legislative Representative, Citizens Union of the City of N. Y., to Judah Gribetz, Governor’s 
Counsel (June 6, 1975) (on file with author) (making no specific mention of statutory penalty class 
actions but noting that “[i]ndividual actions are often too costly for a single consumer to bring.  The 
final award is usually more than offset by the cost of the litigation itself.”); Letter from Luther 
Gatling, Comty Service Soc’y, to Judah Gribetz, Governor’s Counsel (June 3, 1975) (on file with 
author); Recommendation of Citizens Union of the City of N. Y. (week of May 27, 1975) (on file 
with author); Legislative Memorandum from Robert T. Cobb, Assoc. Exec. Dir., N. Y. State 
Council of Churches (Feb. 11, 1975) (on file with author).  See also Letter from George L. Graff, 
Chair, Comm. on State Legislation, and Rhoda Karpatkin, Chair, Special Comm. on Consumer 
Affairs, Assoc. of the Bar of the City of N. Y., to Judah Gribetz, Governor’s Counsel (June 11, 
1975), at 1 (on file with author) (apparently accepting limitation on statutory penalty class actions as 
part of final legislation).  The Association’s Committee on Civil Practice Laws and Rules had in 
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general, proponents of the reform stressed the impracticality of 
vindicating rights for small wrongs, even systematic small wrongs, in 
the absence of a modern class action device akin to Federal Rule 23 
rather than the old New York CPLR § 1005, which drastically limited 
the availability of the class action.137  Passage and enactment of the new 
law was portrayed in the popular press as a great victory for consumers 
with relatively little discussion of the arguments of the law’s opponents 
and no discussion of the separate status of statutory penalties.138 
C. The Almost Invisible Debased Non-Debate Over CPLR § 901(b)139 
Throughout the legislative history of the class action law, there 
appears to have been little serious and sustained discussion of the issue 
of statutory penalty class actions.  In particular, there appears to have 
been little serious examination of, or debate over, the rationale put forth 
in support of the limitation.140  In addition to New York Bar Legislative 
 
1972 issued a Committee Report critical of class actions but did not specifically address statutory 
penalties. 
  The Reports of the Administrative Boards of the Judicial Conference for the relevant time 
periods discuss the basic arguments for or against class actions but contain no express examination 
of the issue of statutory penalty class actions and appears not to have considered this cutback as a 
possible modification of the class action reform generally supported by the Conference. 
 137. See, e.g., Special Comm. on Consumer Affairs, Assoc. of the Bar of the City of N.Y., 
Proposed Class Action Legislation in N.Y. (on file with author) (reviewing history of class actions 
generally and in New York, California experience with liberalized class actions, rationale for and 
criticisms of class actions, strongly concluding that state law should follow approach of FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23 making class actions more available; no mention of statutory penalty issue in majority 
Report, dissenting statements, or supplementary views). 
 138.  See, e.g., Narvaez, Bill to Aid Consumer Suits Passed by the Legislature, supra note 115, 
at 39.  See also supra note 132. 
 139. With apologies to Marc Galanter, although I find the analogy to § 901(b) and Professor 
Galanter’s phraseology too apt to forgo.  See Marc Galanter, News From Nowhere:  The Debased 
Debate Over Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 77 (1993). 
 140. But see Letter from Adolf Homburger, Chair, Comm. to Advise and Consult with the 
Judicial Conference of the State of New York on Civil Practice Law and Rules, to Judah Gribetz, 
Governor’s Counsel (June 6, 1975) (on file with author).  Professor Homburger notes that the final 
legislation differs from the initial bill recommended by the Judicial Conference in that it contains 
the § 901[b] statutory penalty prohibition and in § 902 “requires that the plaintiff within a specified 
time after joinder of issue move for permission to maintain the action as a class action” while the 
original bill required the defendant to move for dismissal of a putative class action.  In addition, § 
904 of the final bill “contains a far more elaborate notification scheme than the original bill” but one 
regarded as “in harmony with the general intent of the bill as originally drafted.”  Id. 
  According to Homburger, “none [of these] changes affect the main thrust of the bill.  They 
were carefully considered and approved by the Advisory Committee to the Judicial Conference.”  
Id. at 1.  However, no written record of any Advisory Committee deliberations is found in the 
official legislative history or appears to have been independently published.  A contemporaneous 
letter states that the Judicial Conference found amendments to the original bill, implicitly including 
the statutory penalty prohibition, “unobjectionable” except for concern over the clarity of language 
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Report 15 cited above, the most extensive discussion of the matter by the 
legislation’s opponents is found in the Chamber of Commerce 
Memorandum to the Governor’s Counsel: 
A class action statute should limit any monetary recovery sought to the 
actual damages sustained. 
 
The purpose of penalty provisions in individual actions envisioned in 
State and Federal law is to encourage wronged individuals and their 
attorneys to pursue their claims by creating a sufficient amount in 
controversy to ensure economic incentive.  Statutory penalties and 
minimum recoveries which are necessary in individual actions are not 
necessary in class actions, where the aggregate damage claims are 
large and sufficient, in and of themselves, to support litigation. 
 
Penalties and class actions simply do not mix.  This was proved in 
Ratner v. Chemical Bank, a case under the Federal Rules where the 
combination caused a potential liability of $130,000,000 although the 
actual damages to individual plaintiffs were zero! 
 
This injustice could be remedied by adding subsection B to Section 
901, to provide that unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty or 
other minimum recovery specifically authorizes the recovery thereof in 
a class action, an action to recovery such a penalty or minimum 
recovery created or imposed by such statute may not be maintained as 
a class action.141 
In response to the lobbying of the bill’s opponents arguing for the 
statutory penalty ban as a means of making the legislation less onerous, 
the bill’s proponents seemed to have accepted the anti-penalty 
arguments with surprisingly little resistance.  For example, 
 
regarding class action motion practice but provides no discussion of the penalty issue.  See Letter 
from Richard A. Bartlett to Judah Gribetz 1 (June 3, 1975).  The Judicial Conference Memorandum 
regarding the original bill does not discuss statutory penalties.  See also Letter from Jay Cox 
O’Brien, Assistant Dir., N.Y.  State Law Revision Commission, to Judah Gribetz and accompanying 
memorandum (June 2, 1975) (noting changes from initial bill that “now appears to meet most of the 
objections to class action bills filed by bar associations over the past several years” but providing no 
specific discussion of statutory penalties or other areas of conflict or amendment). 
  Notwithstanding the Judicial Conference’s seeming tacit support for the statutory penalty 
prohibition, it appears that class action proponents neither seriously assessed nor publically debated 
the wisdom of adding this limitation to the final bill.  See infra note 146-52 and accompanying text. 
 141. Empire State Chamber of Commerce, Memorandum in Opposition to A. 1252 (proposed 
by Fink) and S. 1309 (proposed by Barclay), at 3 (underlining in original) (on file with author) 
(contending that “Recovery of Penalties Should Be Prohibited”). 
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Assemblyman Stanley Fink, a liberal Democratic activist who would 
eventually become Speaker, stated:  
[The final legislation] [p]recludes a class action based on a statute 
creating or imposing a penalty or minimum measure of recovery unless 
the specific statute allows for a class action.  These penalties or 
“minimum damages” are provided as a means of encouraging suits 
where the amounts involved might otherwise be too small.  Where a 
class action is brought, this additional encouragement is not necessary.  
A statutory class action for actual damages would still be 
permissible.142 
Floor debates on the new law were no more probing on the issue of 
whether statutory penalties were so different from ordinary class action 
cases to merit prohibition.  In floor debate just prior to passage in the 
Senate, sponsor Senator Barclay (R-Pulaski) noted:  
[The final bill] has been amended from its original version to exclude 
statutory penalties and minimum measures of recovery from class 
actions unless the statue creating a penalty or minimum measure of 
recovery specifically authorized the remedy thereof.  Spokesmen for 
many groups at the public hearing acknowledged that the imposition of 
penalties which would be appropriate when applied in an individual 
action would produce excessively harsh results when you magnify the 
impact in a class suit. 
   Nevertheless, this amended bill recognizes the power of the 
Legislature to exact penalty provision which are appropriate in class 
action context and leaves the door open for the recovery of such 
penalties in class actions if the Legislature specifically so provides.143 
There appears to have been no other significant discussion of the 
matter during floor debate, although Senator Barclay alluded to 
commentary at a public hearing on the bill for which there appears to 
exist no available transcribed record or docket.  As previously noted, 
popular press reports regarding the class action law did not address the 
issue of statutory penalties.144  The one excerpt of floor debate that made 
the news would likely be interpreted by reasonable readers as suggesting 
that the new law did indeed encompass statutory penalties as well as 
other forms of damages: 
 
 142. See Memorandum by Stanley Fink regarding A. 1252 and S. 1309 (final class action 
legislation), at 2 (on file with author). 
 143.  See Transcript of Proceedings, N.Y. State Senate (May 28, 1975), at S946-S947 (remarks 
of Senator Barclay). 
 144. See supra note 132. 
40
Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 4, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss4/2
7-STEMPEL_44.4_8.7.11_DONE-9.2.11.DOC 9/12/2011  8:38 AM 
2011] SHADY GROVE 947 
   Only Senator Richard E. Schemerhorn, Republican of Cornwall-
on-Hudson, spoke out against the bill.  He asked if one consumer who 
was defrauded by a store was victorious in a lawsuit and was awarded 
damages, would all other customers who had purchased the item be 
entitled to similar awards. 
   When he was told that they would be so entitled, he said “I’m 
against class action.”  He voted against the bill. 
   The New York Consumer Assembly called passage of the measure 
“one of the greatest steps for consumer justice ever taken by this 
Legislature.”145 
The Practice Commentary to the Act, upon which the Shady Grove 
dissent heavily (and perhaps excessively) relied in assessing the 
legislative history of § 901(b)146 notes:  
[The] Judicial Conference proposal for the adoption of Article 9 did 
not contain subdivision (b) of CPLR § 901.  The Legislature added the 
provision, apparently fearing that class judgments awarding statutory 
penalty-type damages to each member of the class would result in 
“annihilating punishment” of the defendant.  See Ratner v. Chemical 
Bank of New York, S.D.N.Y. 1972, 54 F.R.D. 412, 416.  Thus, CPLR § 
901(b) generally prohibits class certification of claims that seek 
recovery of a “penalty or minimum measure of recovery created or 
imposed by statute.  On the other hand, certification is allowed if the 
statute creating the penalty or minimum recovery specifically allows 
for class recovery.  For example, N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2801-d 
authorizes both a minimum monetary recovery and punitive damages 
in private litigation against nursing homes for inadequate provision of 
services, explicitly stating that a class action is permitted.  Id. §2801-
d(4).147 
The Practice Commentary, with its quotation from Ratner v. 
Chemical Bank, clearly served as a core component of Justice 
Ginsburg’s Shady Grove dissent, which cited the “annihilating 
punishment” phrase and accepted as accurate the Commentary’s 
summary of the genesis of § 901(b)’s limitation on class actions.148  But 
 
 145. See Narvaez, Bill to Aid Consumer Suits Passed by the Legislature, supra note 115 
(noting favorable comments about new law suggesting no subject matter or substantive restrictions 
on use of class actions). 
 146. See infra note 148 and accompanying text, (discussing the Shady Grove Court’s 
oversimplified and arguably misleading version of § 901(b)’s legislative history). 
 147. See Vincent Alexander, Practice Commentary to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901. 
 148. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1464 
(2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Aiming to avoid ‘annihilating punishment of the defendant,’ the 
New York Legislature amended the proposed statute to bar the recovery of statutory damages in 
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the phrase appears nowhere in the official bill jacket for the law or in the 
 
class actions.” (citing Vincent Alexander, Practice Commentaries, C901:11, reprinted in 7B 
MCKINNEY’S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK, ANN. 104 (2006)).  A review of the Bill Jacket 
for the new class action law, however, nowhere reflects the legislature using these particularly 
loaded words.  The closest the official legislative history gets is in the two references in interest 
group submissions to Ratner v. Chemical Bank of New York, 54 F.R.D. 412, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), 
where the trial court uses this phrase in refusing to certify a TILA class action notwithstanding the 
absence of an express prohibition on class treatment of such claims in FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
  And, notwithstanding the adage that those in glass houses should not throw stones, I find 
the Shady Grove dissent’s slavish reliance on the Practice Commentaries (following the New York 
Court of Appeals similar deference in Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 863 N.E. 2d 1012, 1015 (N.Y. 
2007) puzzling and unjustified.  Although Practice Commentaries and similar glosses included in 
statutory compilations and annotations can be important helpful materials for attorneys conducting 
research they are, to perhaps state the obvious, not the actual statute or legislative history.  The 
Practice Commentary to § 901(b), in particular, seems essentially to rely only upon Sperry v. 
Crompton.  There is no indication that the Practice Commentary examined the full legislative 
history materials or bill jacket.  The Sperry opinion itself does not reflect any particularly 
comprehensive review or critical assessment of the genesis of § 901(b). 
  Vincent C. Alexander, the author of the Practice Commentary to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b), 
is a long-time professor at St. John’s Law School in New York, whose principal writings are the 
Practice Commentaries to various sections of the New York laws, an Evidence treatise, and a well-
cited law review article.  See Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege:  A 
Study of the Participants, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 191 (1989) (cited in more than eighty law review 
articles and in Swidler & Berlin v. U.S., 524 U.S. 339 (1998) (holding that attorney-client privilege 
survives death of client, in that case former Clinton Justice Department official Vincent Foster, who 
had committed suicide and who had come within the scope of the Whitewater investigation). 
  Professor Alexander was born in 1949 and became a lawyer in 1975, the year of the 
enactment of New York class action legislation that had been developing over the prior three years.  
There is no indication that he worked for the legislature or otherwise participated in the process.  
His ability to characterize the legislative history of the bill thus would seem no better than mine or 
that of other observers distant in space and time, who must depend on the Bill Jacket, news accounts 
of the era, and perhaps interviews (although there is no indication that this was done as part of the 
Practice Commentaries).  In all likelihood, he relied exclusively on the description of § 901(b)’s 
background contained in Sperry v. Crompton, which appeared not to have delved much into the 
almost casual manner in which the sections limitations were grafted onto the bill.  Although not 
exactly a house of cards, neither is this much foundation for maintaining that § 901(b) is central to 
New York’s substantive law. 
  As noted above, an examination of the Bill Jacket and newspaper reports of the period 
hardly suggests the uniform swell of policymaker opinion as fearful of large statutory penalty class 
actions reflected in Ratner v. Chemical Bank, Sperry v. Crompton, or the Shady Grove dissent.  The 
actual legislative history should a much stealthier, unexplored amendment weakening the class 
action bill well out of sight of the general public which, as far as I can determine, never even had a 
chance to read about the interest group lobbying for § 901(b) until it was a fait accompli.  Without 
doubt, there was no meaningful public debate on the wisdom of § 901(b). 
  Under these circumstances, the Practice Commentary is certainly incomplete and arguably 
misleading, as is the Sperry v. Crompton description of § 901(b)’s genesis.  It is troubling that the 
highest court in the nation’s fourth  largest state and four Justices of the nation’s highest court were 
so quick to embrace what appears to be a superficial assessment of the section as the definitive word 
on § 901(b)’s legislative history.  A more accurate and nuanced “telling” of the § 901(b) story (see 
Shady Grove dissent, 130 S. Ct. at 1464) (“the story behind § 901(b)’s enactment deserves telling”) 
reveals substantial problems with the Sperry v. Crompton and Practice Commentary account. 
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Legislative Service’s formal compilation of legislative history, although 
Ratner is noted by proponents of § 901(b) as an example of the in 
terrorem effect of statutory penalty class actions. 
Reading only the Shady Grove dissent, one could get the 
misleading impression that § 901(b) emerged from a civics textbook 
example of deliberative democracy in action.  The dissent’s argument 
that “[t]he story behind § 901(b)’s enactment deserves telling”149 is 
correct.  Unfortunately, however, the dissent misleadingly portrayed this 
gritty exercise of legislative sausage-making in fairy tale fashion.  The 
dissent begins innocently (but incompletely) enough, noting that in 
1975, the Judicial Conference of the State of New York proposed a new 
class-action statute designed to “set up a flexible, functional scheme” 
that would provide “an effective, but controlled group remedy.”150  The 
statement is true but incomplete in that it omits any discussion of the 
years of effort preceding the 1975 legislative success and the steady rear 
guard actions against the law waged by vested special interests that 
feared the empowerment of consumers.151  It also bears noting that the 
Judicial Conference, hardly a radical group of Marxists intent on 
pillaging legitimate businesses, thought the original bill was “controlled” 
enough in its remedy without any limitation on statutory penalty class 
actions.152  Indeed, the model for the original New York class action 
proposal was Federal Rule 23, a rule that is considered sufficiently 
“controlled” by most of the legal world, notwithstanding criticisms of 
class action abuses. 
The dissent’s oversimplified view becomes more apparent in the 
next paragraph as it accepts as Gospel what might be termed the “Cliff 
Notes” history of the law contained in a single Court of Appeals decision 
and the McKinney’s Practice Commentary to the resulting statute. 
   While the Judicial Conference proposal was in the New York 
Legislature’s hopper, “various groups advocated for the addition of a 
provision that would prohibit class action plaintiffs from being 
awarded a statutorily-created penalty . . . except when expressly 
authorized in the pertinent statute.”  [citing Sperry v. Crompton Corp., 
8 N.Y.3d 204, 211 (2007).]  These constituents “feared that recoveries 
beyond actual damages could lead to excessively harsh results.”  “They 
 
 149. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464. 
 150. See id. at 1464. 
 151. See supra text and accompanying notes Section III.A. 
 152. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text (originally proposed class action bill, 
through several legislative sessions, contained no statutory penalty limitation, suggesting that legal 
experts crafting the bill saw no basis for such a restriction). 
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also argued that there was no need to permit class actions . . . [because] 
statutory penalties . . . provided an aggrieved party with a sufficient 
economic incentive to pursue a claim.”  Such penalties, constituents 
observed, often far exceed a plaintiff’s actual damages.  “When 
lumped together,” they argued, “penalties and class actions produce 
overkill.” [citing to letter from Retail Merchants, Inc. to Governor’s 
Counsel, supra]. 
   Aiming to avoid “annihilating punishment of the defendant,” the 
New York Legislature amended the proposed statute to bar the 
recovery of statutory damages in class actions.  Vincent Alexander, 
Practice Commentaries, C901:11, reprinted in 7B MCKINNEY’S 
CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK, ANN. 104 (2006) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In his signing statement, Governor Hugh 
Carey stated that the new statute “empowers the court to prevent abuse 
of the class action device and provides a controlled remedy.”  
Memorandum on Approving L. 1975, Ch. 207, reprinted in 1975 N.Y. 
Laws at 1748 (emphasis added). 
   “[T]he final bill . . . was the result of a compromise among 
competing interests.” [citing Sperry].153 
As noted above and discussed further below, this portrayal of the 
emergence of § 901(b) is ironic in that in cases like Ratner v. Chemical 
Bank, Federal Rule 23 proved to be a sufficiently controlled remedy in 
that class certification of a penalty action was denied where the court 
found it to be too potentially coercive in light of the lack of willful 
statutory violation or actual harm to the named plaintiff.  But a political 
actor (or anyone else) reading the reference to Ratner made by groups 
opposing the new law would be mislead to believe that Ratner and 
Federal Rule 23 had indeed permitted a problematic, no-actual-damages 
class action seeking $130 million.154  Further, the “constituents” of 
which the dissent speaks were not rank-and-file voters (and certainly not 
consumers) and prevailed without ever having their arguments tested in 
legislative or public debate.  The retail merchants, insurers, banks, and 
others concerned about greater leverage (represented largely through 
their official lobbying organizations rather than expressions of the 
members individually)155 obtained a concession in the final weeks of the 
 
 153. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1464 (citations omitted except as indicated in text) 
(emphasis in original). 
 154. See supra note 141 accompanying text. 
 155. Depending on the legislation and its circumstances, this can be important.  For example, a 
lobbying organization’s position may be considerably more left or right than the views of many of 
its members.  For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce appears to have become steadily more 
conservative on public policy issues during the past two decades, so much so that some prominent 
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legislative session with essentially no public knowledge of or discussion 
of their proposal.  In particular, there is no basis upon review of the 
law’s Bill Jacket for concluding that when Governor Carey referred to a 
“controlled” remedy (language the dissent sought so important it was 
italicized), he was referring to § 901(b). 
The dissent’s discussion of legislative history also suggests that it is 
overly credulous of the complaint that class actions are unduly coercive, 
a form of legal blackmail posing company killing risk: 
“Even in the mine-run case, a class action can result in “potentially 
ruinous liability.”  Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. Rule Civ. 
Proc. 23, 28 U.S.C. App. P. 143.  A court’s decision to certify a class 
accordingly places pressure on the defendant to settle even 
unmeritorious claims.  See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 
U.S. 463, 476, 98 S. Ct. 2454, 57 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1978).  When 
representative plaintiffs seek statutory damages, pressure to settle may 
be heightened because a class action poses the risk of massive liability 
unmoored to actual injury.  See, e.g., Ratner v. Chemical Bank New 
York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.DNY 1972) (exercising 
“considerable discretion of a pragmatic nature” to refuse to certify a 
class because the plaintiffs suffered negligible actual damages but 
sought statutory damages of $13,000,000).156 
 
companies have dropped membership or publically disagreed with Chamber positions.  Susie 
Shutts, Companies Abandon Chamber of Commerce Over Climate Change Stance, YES! 
MAGAZINE, Oct. 8, 2009, available at http://www.yesmagazine.org/planet/companies-abandon-
chamber-of-commerce-over-climate-change-stance.  (Apple, Pacific Gas & Electric, PNM, and 
Exelon withdraw from organization; Nike withdraws from board by retains membership; General 
Electric and Johnson & Johnson publicly criticize Chamber position on climate change). 
 156.  See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1465.  The dissent was aware that in Ratner, the trial court 
denied certification due to in terrorem concerns.  But, as noted above, there is nothing to indicate 
that the state legislature or Governor Carey was aware of the correct Ratner holding as the case is 
misleadingly invoked by interest groups lobbying against the state class action law.  See supra note 
174 and accompanying text..  It is worth re-quoting the Empire State Chamber of Commerce, 
Memorandum in Opposition to A. 1252 and S. 1309 (to establish new rules for “class actions”), at 3 
(underlining in original) (see supra note 141 and accompanying text), which was the primary 
invocation of Ratner as part of the business opposition to the proposed law: 
Penalties and class actions simply do not mix.  This was proved in Ratner v. Chemical 
Bank, a case under the Federal Rules where the combination caused a potential liability 
of $130,000,000 although the actual damages to individual plaintiffs were zero! 
 
This injustice could be remedies by adding subsection B to Section 901, to provide that 
unless a statue creating or imposing a penalty or other minimum recovery specifically 
authorized the recovery ther3of in a class action, an action to recover such a penalty or 
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Although the “class action as unfair legal blackmail” notion is 
widespread, a closer look at class actions in operation and their actual 
impact on business tends to debunk this mythology.157  Consequently, it 
is a little disheartening for the dissent to seem to so readily accept this 
argument against the class action and the underlying erroneous argument 
that even in the absence of class certification consumers have adequate 
incentives to pursue claims vindicating their statutory rights.158  
Undoubtedly, the dissenters’ response would be that regardless of the 
errors of the anti-class action arguments, they were persuasive to New 
York lawmakers.  But, as a fuller legislative history of § 901(b) shows, 
the anti-penalty provision became part of the resulting law with almost 
no scrutiny or analysis.159  This should give courts pause before 
privileging this type of “law” over validly promulgated Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Justice Stevens in concurrence was less of a cheerleader for the § 
901(b) legislation than were the Ginsburg dissenters but was still unduly 
deferential to the law and unduly credulous of the drive-by legislative 
history incorporated into the Practice Commentaries to McKinney’s 
 
Id.  A reasonable reader could view the Chamber of Commerce memorandum as describing a case 
in which uninjured plaintiffs were permitted to recover $130 million when the exact opposite 
occurred in Ratner, notwithstanding the FED. R. CIV. P. 23 has no limitation on statutory penalty 
class actions. 
  Ratner was in another instance cited as an example of “uneven” application of FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23 due to the large discretion possessed by federal judges.  See Report No. 405, State Bar of 
New York re Proposed Class Action Legislation, at 2 (on file with author).  Although the State Bar 
clearly opposed the class action law and favored Ratner’s restrictive view of Federal Rule 23, the 
case is not used in this instance to make the “annihilating punishment” argument.  The reader of this 
report would gain little actual knowledge of the Ratner case itself or Federal Rule 23’s treatment of 
statutory penalty class actions. 
  The Shady Grove dissent to a degree recognized that § 901(b) is special interest legislation 
that is not particularly logical in that “suits seeking statutory damages are arguably best suited to the 
class device because individual proof of actual damages is unnecessary.”  Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. 
at 1465 (italics in original).  But instead of considering whether this sort of illogical provision 
favoring vested interests should trigger Erie’s ejection of an otherwise applicable Federal Rule, the 
dissent concluded that this flaw in § 901(b) emphasized the substantive nature of the provision.  
“New York’s decision instead to block class-action proceedings for statutory damages therefore 
makes scant sense, except as a means to a manifestly substantive end.”  Id. 
 157. See, e.g., Stempel, Class Actions and Limited Vision, supra note 99, at 1127, 1133-55 
(arguing that criticisms of coercive force of class certification is overstated); Silver, supra note 101 
(comprehensive debunking of the exaggerated blackmail critique of class actions); Hay & 
Rosenberg, supra note 101 (characterizing class device more as an equalizer than as means by 
which plaintiffs for counsel gain excessive leverage over business defendants). 
 158. See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text, (statutory penalties, even with possible 
attorney fee shifting to victorious consumers, are insufficient incentives for bringing individual suits 
against defendants violating statute). 
 159. See supra text and accompanying note Section III.C. 
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Annotated New York Statutes.  Like the dissent, he accepted the 
legislation as a considered judgment of New York but saw it as 
sufficiently procedural that it was required to yield to Federal Rule 
23.160 
As previously discussed, the actual legislative history of § 901(b) is 
one of interest group advocacy and unduly easy acceptance in order to 
defuse remaining opposition to the pending law, with no serious 
examination of the merits of the question of whether statutory penalty 
class actions are excessively confiscatory or business-killing.  Further, 
the Shady Grove dissent and concurrence as well as the New York Court 
of Appeals and the McKinney’s Practice Commentaries all appear to 
share the same cardboard characterization of § 901(b)’s legislative 
history.  When the entire Bill Jacket and surrounding materials are 
reviewed, it is clear that cases like Ratner v. Chemical Bank were an 
important illustration of the potential evils of penalty class actions.  But 
nowhere in the legislative history do any official actors embrace the 
“annihilating punishment” rhetoric of Ratner.  But somehow, through 
the magic of translation and the social construction of history, the almost 
afterthought-like attachment of § 901(b) to the new class action law has 
become enshrined as a palpable fear of class actions destroying 
businesses widely held by the New York citizenry.  The actual 
legislative history is hardly as phobic about class actions as the sketch of 
it contained in the McKinney’s Practice Commentaries, the Sperry v. 
Crompton Corp. Court of Appeals decision, and the Shady Grove 
dissent. 
 
 160. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448, 1458 (“The legislative history, moreover, does not 
clearly describe a judgment that § 901(b) would operate as a limitation on New York’s statutory 
damages.  In evaluating that legislative history, it is necessary to distinguish between procedural 
rules adopted for some policy reason and seemingly procedural rules that are intimately bound up in 
the scope of a substantive right or remedy.  Although almost every rule is adopted for some reason 
and has some effect on the outcome of litigation, not every state rule “defines the dimensions of [a] 
claim itself.”  New York clearly crafted § 901(b) with the intent that only certain lawsuits—those 
for which there were not statutory penalties—could be joined in class actions in New York courts.  
That decision reflects a policy judgment about which lawsuits should proceed in New York courts 
in a class form and which should not.  As Justice Ginsburg carefully outlines, § 901(b) was 
‘apparently’ adopted in response to fears that the class-action procedure applied to statutory 
penalties would lead to ‘annihilating punishment of the defendant.’  Vincent Alexander, Practice 
Commentaries, C901:11, reprinted in 7B MCKINNEY’S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK ANN. 
104 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).  See also Sperry v. Crompton Cor., 863 N.E.2d 
1012, 1015.  But statements such as these are not particularly strong evidence that § 901(b) serves to 
define who can obtain a statutory penalty or that certifying such a class would enlarge New York’s 
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One might ask how it came to pass that the Shady Grove dissent 
(and to a lesser extent the Shady Grove concurrence) came to provide 
such a straw man picture of the class action law.  One suspects that 
rather than focusing on the Bill Jacket itself or the larger contemporary 
context of the legislation, which would have lead the courts to appreciate 
the astounding lack of substantive discussion and public input 
surrounding § 901(b), both the New York Court of Appeals in Sperry v. 
Crompton and the Shady Grove dissent and concurrence took a shortcut 
that oversimplified and idealized the statutory penalty ban on class 
actions. 
In Sperry v. Crompton, the Court of Appeals relied excessively on a 
McKinney’s Practice Commentary that was at best oversimplified and 
arguably misleading.161  The Shady Grove dissent in turn relied 
excessively on Sperry and the Court of Appeals oversimplification rather 
than looking closely at the full legislative history and the political 
realities of § 901(b)’s non-examination by both political elites and the 
public.  The vision of legislative history set forth in Sperry and the 
Shady Grove dissent is incomplete and misleading in elevating an 
expedient last minute concession to self-serving private interest groups 
to the status of momentous expression of state substantive law.162  By 
contrast, the Shady Grove plurality’s preference for avoiding this 
political thicket looks positively enlightened as well as more 
expeditious, simpler, and subject to more consistent application. 
Unlike Rule 23, designed to further procedural fairness and efficiency, 
§ 901(b) (we are told [by the dissenters]),”responds to an entirely 
different concern”:  the fear that allowing statutory damages to be 
awarded on a class-wide basis would “produce overkill.”  The dissent 
reaches this conclusion on the basis of (1) constituent concern recorded 
 
 161. See supra note 148 (describing limitations of Practice Commentary as authoritative 
legislative history). 
 162.  Sperry also illustrates the degree to which § 901(b) is based on the faulty premise that the 
existence of statutory penalties eliminates the rationale for class actions.  Sperry involved an 
antitrust claim under New York General Business Law § 340, which provides for treble damages in 
the event of a violation.  See Sperry, 863 N.E.2d at 1012-15.  Although trebling may be a powerful 
remedy and significant penalty where the antitrust injury is large, it hardly does much to make 
individual litigation of small claims feasible.  For example, a consumer may pay a few cents more 
for a household product due to the anti-competitive conduct by the manufacturer or retailer.  Even if 
the consumer is regularly buying the product in Costco or Sam’s Club sized portions for many 
years, the amount of injury to the individual consumer will never prompt a rational litigant (save 
perhaps the independently wealthy, unemployed crusader or perhaps an advocacy group) to incur 
the time, effort, and aggravation of litigation, even if recovery of out-of-pocket counsel fees is 
possible.  Without class treatment, this type of antitrust violation is essentially immunized in New 
York courts. 
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in the law’s bill jacket; (2) a commentary suggesting that the 
Legislature “apparently fear[ed]” that combining class actions and 
statutory penalties “could result in annihilating punishment of the 
defendant,”; (3) a remark by the Governor in his signing statement that 
§ 901(b) “provides a controlled remedy,”, and (4) a state court’s 
statement that the final text of § 901(b) “was the result of a 
compromise among competing interests.’”  
   This evidence of the New York Legislature’s purpose is pretty 
sparse.  But even accepting the dissent’s account of the Legislature’s 
objective at face value, it cannot override the statute’s clear text.  Even 
if its aim is to restrict the remedy a plaintiff can obtain, § 901(b) 
achieves that end by limiting a plaintiff’s power to maintain a class 
action [which directly conflicts with Federal Rule 23].163 
As the foregoing, more comprehensive, review of the legislative 
history, politics, and journalistic coverage of the law shows (but still one 
“pretty sparse” owing to the lack of sustained examination of § 901(b)), 
the story of the inclusion of the penalty limitation is something other 
than a pure civics textbook example of the rational, public-regarding 
legislature in action.  The bill as a whole reflected sound public policy 
and widely shared sentiment accumulated over years of analysis and 
experience.  But the engrafting of the statutory penalty limitation came 
on with all the fanfare of an earmark to an appropriations bill.  Although 
not descending entirely to the level of the lobbyist’s side deal in a side 
corridor, neither does the story of § 901(b) inspire much confidence that 
the penalty limitation reflects the considered judgment of the New York 
electorate or their chosen representatives regarding this constriction of 
the class action device. 
D. The Case Misleadingly Used to Illustrate Allegedly Abusive Class 
Action 
A look at Ratner v. Chemical Bank,164 which served as something 
of a poster child example of an oppressive class action165 serves as an 
 
 163. See Shady Grove,  130 S. Ct. at 1440 (citations omitted) (“The manner in which the law 
‘could have been written,’ has no bearing; what matters is the law the Legislature did enact.  We 
cannot rewrite that to reflect our perception of legislative purpose.  The dissent’s concern for state 
prerogatives is frustrated rather than furthered by revising state laws when a potential conflict with a 
Federal Rule arises; the state-friendly approach would be to accept the law as written and test the 
validity of the Federal Rule.” (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original)). 
 164. Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) 
 165. In addition to being referenced in the Practice Commentaries to § 901(b), Ratner was 
frequently cited by opponents of class actions as an example of a situation in which aggregation of 
trivial claims could create excessive liability for inadvertent violations of the law.  Lost in most of 
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instructive beginning to debunking some of the mythology surrounding 
§ 901(b) and appreciating the absence of any real reflection regarding 
this carve-back of the original class action bill supported by New York’s 
judiciary and consumer groups.  Plaintiff, “holder of a Master Charge 
credit card . . . sued to redress an asserted violation of the Act by 
defendant—namely the failure to show a ‘nominal annual percentage 
rate’ on a periodic statement reporting an outstanding principal balance 
but no interest charge yet accrued” and “undertook to sue for himself 
and as representative of other debtors similarly situated.”166  The Truth 
in Lending Act (“TILA”) provides for minimum liability of $100 plus 
costs and reasonable counsel fees for each violation, regardless of 
whether plaintiff has suffered actual damages.167  Plaintiff Ratner sought 
certification for a class estimated to include as many as 130,000 card 
holders.  “At a minimum rate of $100 apiece, this class would be entitled 
to a sum in the neighborhood of $130,000,000.”168 
But the federal trial judge, former Columbia Law School Dean 
Marvin Frankel, would have none of what he perceived to be a 
pretextual claim.169  He questioned plaintiff’s theory of the case almost 
to the point of making a summary judgment decision adverse to plaintiff 
Plaintiff’s theory, it may be recalled, is that the “nominal annual 
percentage rate” should have been shown so that plaintiff (and others 
like him) could compare competing interest rates and make an 
informed choice.  Assuming the rate (18%) had been shown, and 
assuming plaintiff had elected to borrow elsewhere, and assuming he 
could have borrowed at 6%, the difference in annual percentage rate 
would have been 12%, or, for the one month affected by the omission, 
1%.  The principal amount affected by the rate was a new indebtedness 
of $191.58. . . . The difference in interest, even on these excessively 
favorable assumptions, would have been less than $2.  More 
realistically, of course, consumer credit of the kind in question comes 
generally at a rate very like 18% per annum.170 
 
the discussion is that in Ratner itself, this theoretically unfair and business-destroying class action 
was not permitted even under Federal Rule 23, which had no prohibition on penalty class actions. 
 166. Id. at 412. 
 167. See 15 U.S.C. § 16540(e). 
 168. Ratner, 54 F.R.D. at 414. 
 169. I borrow the term from Professor Sebok, who has deemed certain classes of purported 
technical legal violations that cause little or no harm but create the prospect of generating counsel 
fees, extorting settlements, or gaining business or publicity leverage as “pretextual torts” in that the 
plaintiffs are not seeking significant corrective justice.  See Anthony Sebok, Remarks, Symposium, 
Asbestos Litigation, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 281 (2006) (panel discussion). 
 170. Ratner, 54 F.R.D. at 413, n.2 (citation omitted). 
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Clearly, Judge Frankel saw plaintiff and counsel crying crocodile 
tears in order to gain leverage over the bank for purposes of extorting a 
settlement in a case without genuine victims, noting that “[n]o other 
member of the proposed class has evinced an interest in the lawsuit or 
brought a similar suit elsewhere, and the one-year limitation period” for 
TILA suits “has long since expired.”171  But it was the sheer magnitude 
of the case and the bank’s potential exposure rather than the merits of 
the claim that appeared to offend the court and led to a denial of class 
certification. 
[A]llowance of thousands of minimum recoveries like plaintiff’s 
would carry to an absurd and stultifying extreme the specific and 
essentially inconsistent remedy Congress prescribed as the means of 
private enforcement.172 
 
Students of [Federal Rule 23] have been lead generally to recognize 
that its broad and open-ended terms call for the exercise of some 
considerable discretion of a pragmatic nature.  Appealing to that kind 
of judgment, defendant points out that (1) the incentive of class-action 
benefits is unnecessary in view of the Act’s provisions for a $100 
minimum recovery and payment of costs and a reasonable fee for 
counsel; and (2) the proposed recovery of $100 each for some 130,000 
class members would be a horrendous, possibly annihilating 
punishment, unrelated to any damage to the purported class or to any 
benefit to defendant, for what is at most a technical and debatable 
violation of the Truth in Lending Act.  These points are cogent and 
persuasive.  They are summarized compendiously in the overall 
conclusion stated earlier:  the allowance of this as a class action is 
essentially inconsistent with the specific remedy supplied by Congress 
and employed by plaintiff in this case.  It is not fairly possible in the 
circumstances of this case to find the [Federal Rule23](b)(3) form of 
[damages] class action “superior to” this specifically “available 
[method] for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”173 
The Ratner court’s rationale became the playbook for elements of 
the New York bar and business interest groups attempting to prohibit 
penalty class actions as a means of weakening proposed legislation that 
they disfavored overall.174  To a degree, this is understandable in that the 
Ratner arguments are not bad, particularly on the facts of that case, and 
 
 171. Id. at 414.  See also id. at 415 (attacking other aspects of substance of plaintiff’s theory of 
the case and claimed injury). 
 172. Id. at 414. 
 173. Id. at 416. 
 174. See supra note 164-71 and accompanying text . 
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the opinion was authored by one of the country’s most prestigious 
jurists.175  But the Ratner rationale is hardly unassailable and was in any 
event not seriously examined during the legislative process that led to 
the almost sub silentio pruning of the new progressive state class action 
law by cutting out statutory penalty class actions. 
One can take serious issue with the Ratner Court’s rationale that 
annual percentage rate disclosure would have done little good to the 
plaintiff (and proposed class) because it was only one month of 
information omission, which amounts to little accrued interest for the 
time and principal at issue.  To be sure, when the matter is sliced so 
thinly, the damages appear trivial.  But if the full disclosure demanded 
by TILA was not present at the outset of a patron’s decision to acquire or 
use a credit card, it could have considerable consequence.  The 
cardholder might use the card for major purchases that would otherwise 
have been forgone or alternatively financed.  Perhaps even disclosure a 
month later will do little to help the cardholder already committed to a 
high interest path that might have otherwise been avoided.  To be sure, a 
month’s negligent omission of disclosure hardly seems like a capital 
offense.  But given the avowed deterrent purpose of TILA, Ratner is a 
bit too glib in rejecting the notion of real injury to the plaintiff(s). 
In addition, it simply appears not to be correct to suggest that a 
$130 million judgment would comprise an “annihilating punishment” of 
Chemical Bank.  In 1972, Chemical Bank was the fourth largest bank in 
the United States, with assets of $15 billion.176  The award sought by 
Ratner would surely sting and appears grossly disproportionate to any 
harm done, but it likely would not have led to the Bank’s demise.  
Although class certification would have given Mr. Ratner and his 
counsel considerable leverage over the bank, the bank had not only the 
option of attempting to settle the claim relatively cheaply (arguably 
reducing any blackmail from the certification to a mere graymail cost of 
doing business that would likely be passed on to customers and the 
 
 175. In addition to his stature as Columbia Law Dean, Judge Frankel was a noted jurist 
prominent in public debates over judicial administration and the legal function, perhaps most 
prominently during his ongoing debate with Hofstra Law Dean Monroe Freedman over the lawyer’s 
role when confronting issues of client perjury.  Compare MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYER’S 
ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975) (taking strong view of lawyer as partisan advocate with 
view constraints), with MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980) (criticizing Freedman’s 
view and emphasizing lawyer’s duties to as officer of the court).  After leaving the bench, Judge 
Frankel enjoyed a distinguished (although occasionally controversial) career as a name partner in a 
prominent New York law firm. 
 176. FUNDING UNIVERSE, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Chemical-
Banking-Corporation-Company-History.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
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public)177 but also the prospect of convincing the court that such an 
award was unwarranted and unconscionable and rendered an absurd 
result at odds with TILA’s legislative intent and statutory purpose.178  
Although such a finding might have been controversial and on the edge 
of judicial activism, it is arguably no more of a reach than what the court 
actually did – refusing even to certify a class in which the Federal Rule 
23(a) prerequisites for class certification appeared certainly to have been 
met.179  If the matter was to be adjudicated at all a Federal Rule 23(b)(3) 
class action would have been “superior” to 130,000 individual suits.180 
 
 177. I realize such a passing on of litigation expenses has costs of its own.  But if the net effect 
of such settlements is to make the lenders more careful about observing statutory commands 
regarding disclosure to costumers, net social welfare may be increased by more than the additional 
costs imposed on customers to pay for the settlement. 
 178. TILA, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693, was 
designed to require that lenders make adequate disclosures regarding interest rates and other terms 
and conditions of their loans in order to “facilitate comparison shopping for credit.”  In particular, 
disclosure of finance charges and the effective annual percentages charged for the use of money are 
to be disclosed.  See Robert A. Schwartz, Note, Can Arbitration Do More for Consumers?  The 
TILA Class Action Reconsidered, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 811, n.19 (2003). 
 179. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) provides that a class may be maintained if the following minimum 
prerequisites are satisfied:   
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are 
questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defense of the class; and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
Id.  In addition, a claim must also qualify for class action treatment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(b).  See TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 2, at 788-95; JAMES, JR. ET AL, supra note 2, § 10.23; 
WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 72.  The FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) requirements were clearly satisfied in 
Ratner as the putative class was huge, the TILA claims of the group were essentially the same, and 
Plaintiff Ratner had competent legal counsel that could adequately represent the class if it were 
certified. 
 180. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) provides for three possible types of class action:  one seeking to 
avoid inconsistent adjudications or where an initial adjudication would prejudice the rights of other 
class members (a FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1) class action); one seeking to order particular defendant 
conduct via an injunction or other apt relief (a FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) class action); or one seeking 
damages on behalf of the class (a FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) class action).  In order to qualify as a 
damages class action, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) requires that the court find that “questions of law or 
fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, 
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating 
the controversy.”  In making this determination, the trial court may consider: 
(A) The class members interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of 
separate actions; 
(B) The extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by 
or against class members;  
(C) The desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the 
particular forum; and  
(D) The likely difficulties in managing a class action. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 2, at 788-95;  JAMES, JR. ET AL., supra 
note 2, § 10.23; WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 72. 
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In addition, Ratner can be criticized for its implicit view that large 
class actions seeking large total awards are by their very nature 
disfavored.  Such an attitude tends to undermine the very rationale of the 
class action.  The 1966 Amendments to Federal Rule 23 were not 
designed to accord class action treatment to only modest or medium 
sized aggregations of claims involving common issues of law and fact.  
There is no size limitation in Federal Rule 23.181  Judicial imposition of 
an implicit size limitation is judicial activism that functions to reduce the 
articulated scope of a legislative enactment.182  In this regard, a judge 
arguably even more prominent and respected than Ratner trial judge 
Frankel has characterized this aspect of the opinion as “one of those rare 
instances where a judicial Homer nodded.”183 
E. The Flawed Rationale At the Core of CPLR § 901(b) as a 
Cautionary Tale Regarding Excessive Deference to State 
Lawmaking 
In the main, however, one can take greatest issue with the Ratner 
Court’s view that TILA already provides copious remedy for the 
 
  As noted above, Judge Frankel concluded that a class action was not a superior means of 
adjudicating such a gigantic dispute with the aroma of a pretextual tort and that concentration of so 
many claims in one case was undesirably.  But because the class members had not interest in 
individual adjudication and the failure to certify a class effectively precluded enforcement of a 
federal statute, other reasonable jurists might disagree, notwithstanding the practical impact of class 
certification in terms of giving Ratner significant settlement leverage over the Bank. 
 181. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 & advisory committee note to 1966 Amendment to Rule 23. 
 182. Although the Federal Rules are not enacted through the normal legislative process, they 
carry the force of statute.  After a Federal Civil Rule is promulgated through the normal rulemaking 
process, which includes congressional “approval” through failing to intervene after Supreme Court 
promulgation of the Rule, “[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect 
after such rules have taken effect.”  See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).  See JAMES, JR. ET. AL., supra note 2, 
§ 2.36; WRIGHT, supra note 2, §§ 54-55; Burbank, supra note 59. 
 183. See Parker v. Time Warner Ent’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 23, 27, n.4 (2d Cir. 2003) (Newman, 
J., concurring) (characterizing Judge Frankel’s undue resistance to large class actions in Ratner was 
an uncharacteristic mistake and that “[a]lthough Ratner has been cited favorably by many courts, I 
believe this is one of those rare instances where a judicial Homer nodded” (citations omitted)).  
Judge Jon Newman has been a highly regarded federal district and Second Circuit judge for nearly 
forty years and was prominently mentioned as being on President Clinton’s “short list” of possible 
nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court.  See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 
331, 395 (2003) (referring to Newman as well-respected judge); Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the 
Jury:  The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 33, 94 (2003) (same). 
  The allusion to Homer nodding comes from AUGUSTUS S. WILKINS, THE ARS POETICA OF 
HORACE 402 (1964) (“Homer himself hath been observ’d to nod.”) (quoted in BARTLETT’S 
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (13th ed. 1951) and refers the inevitability of human error, inattention, or 
insufficient reflection even among highly talented humans).  See Parker, 331 F.3d at 27. 
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wronged financial consumer.  In addition to the $100 statutory penalty, 
the Court notes that counsel fees are available to the prevailing plaintiff 
and that they would be approximately $20,000.  But even this sort of 
recovery (possible only because the matter became a test case for high-
powered lawyers)184 hardly makes the plaintiff whole.  Plaintiff remains 
uncompensated for the time, effort, and inconvenience of being a major 
case litigant.  A victory on the TILA claim in Ratner will never 
compensate Plaintiff Ratner for these losses.  The award of counsel fees 
merely prevents Ratner’s claim from being a huge drain on his personal 
finances.185 
This is hardly the sort of incentive that prompts otherwise sane 
citizens to tilt at judicial windmills by picking a fight with one of the 
nation’s largest financial institutions and its high-powered counsel.  
Even if one accepts that the “real” plaintiff in the case is plaintiff’s law 
firm, the incentive structure and potential rewards are hardly as 
munificent as the Ratner court suggests.  Twenty thousand dollars is a 
nice chunk of change, but it is hardly free money.  It represents the law 
firm’s opportunity costs in bringing the case and is to some degree 
contingent. 
In addition, there is always a contingency that may be adverse to 
plaintiffs like Ratner.  Even what appears to be a strong TILA case may 
not be a sure winner.  Even a sure winner may run up against a judge 
who dislikes the Act and rules adversely, requiring at minimum a trip to 
the Court of Appeals for compensation.  At the end of even a successful 
litigation “day,” the lawyers may find that they could have earned far 
more than $20,000 had they invested similar time, effort and skill in 
pursuing other class actions, basic tort claims such as automobile 
accidents or slip-and-fall incidents, or even through the grind of 
insurance defense tort work.  Without TILA’s minimum statutory 
damages and fee-shifting, no sane person would litigate a minor TILA 
 
 184. The Ratner plaintiffs were aided by Professors Jack Greenberg, Eric Schapper, and Philip 
Schrag.  Chemical Bank was represented by Cravath, Swaine & Moore, a top national law firm.  See 
Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (listing counsel). 
 185. Settlement of class actions must be approved by the court.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).  At 
the time Ratner was decided, it was permissible in settling a class action for the named class 
representatives to receive a settlement amount greater than that of other class members and larger 
than the actual losses incurred by the named representatives in order to compensate the 
representative for the burdens of carrying the litigation forward on behalf of the class.  Subsequent 
legislation forbids such enhanced settlement payments to class members in securities class action.  
See 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (codifying Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)).  See also TEPLY & WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 788-95, supra note 
2; JAMES, JR., HAZARD, JR. & LEUBSDORF, supra note 2, §10.23; WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 72. 
55
Stempel: Shady Grove
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
7-STEMPEL_44.4_8.7.11_DONE-9.2.11.DOC 9/12/2011  8:38 AM 
962 AKRON LAW REVIEW [44:907 
violation.  But even with these plaintiff-strengthening tools, there are 
many factors counseling the sane against litigation, at least when it must 
be pursued on an individual, case-by-case basis. 
Put another way, the mere presence of a statutory penalty, even one 
high in relation to actual injury, often does not create much incentive for 
pursuing individual litigation.  One need only ask the rhetorical 
question:  Would a consumer like Ratner aggrieved by a technical TILA 
violation who had lost little in actual damages seek out counsel and 
prosecute an individual claim just to have a shot at $100 in statutory 
damages and reimbursement of counsel fees?  Would such a cranky do-
gooder consumer even be able to find a competent lawyer willing to take 
the case? 
In my view, the answer to both questions is a resounding “no.”  
Only the possibility of class action treatment spurred Ratner and counsel 
to action.  Without class certification, the case died (there was never any 
appellate consideration of the trial court’s refusal to accord class 
treatment), as have other TILA claims denied class certification.  
Undoubtedly, there are untold numbers of TILA claims that were never 
brought because of these practical financial and logistical barriers.  The 
Ratner Court’s own opinion suggests this by noting that other than 
Plaintiff Ratner no other putative class members had come forward to 
litigate with the bank over these issues despite the supposedly enticing 
allure of the possibility of $100 statutory damages and repayment of 
counsel fees. 
In this sense, the Ratner rationale—and that of those who lobbied 
for § 901(b) in the New York law—is seriously flawed and, at least in 
my view, outright wrong.  In many, perhaps even most cases where 
statutory penalties are established, they are nonetheless usually 
insufficient to make individual pursuit of modest claims realistic.  Even 
a statute with a strong penalty provision such as  Insurance Law § 5106, 
the statute at issue in the underlying dispute in Shady Grove, a 
substantive law that provides for two percent (2%) interest per month 
regarding unpaid medical services to no-fault insurance claimants,  does 
not do enough to make individual litigation very attractive. 
As all Justices observed in Shady Grove, the statutory penalty as 
applied to the past due medical bill for insured Sonia Galvez was only 
approximately $500.  Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is heated in its 
condemnation of the unwisdom of allowing this $500 claim to become a 
$5 million claim.  My question is why Justice Ginsburg is not similarly 
concerned that even with the statutory penalties provided by New York 
Insurance Law § 5106, there exists a situation where insurance 
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companies, which by definition make money by “playing the float” and 
holding funds as long as possible before paying even valid claims.186 
 
 186. See Warren E. Buffett, Letter to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. 2, 7-10 (Feb. 
21, 2003) (sections in letter on “The Economics of Property/Casualty Insurance” and “Insurance 
Operations”) (on file with author) (recapping 2002 year; emphasizing importance of “float”—
premium dollars and investment funds held by the insurer  prior to being needed to pay claims—to 
profitability of insurance companies.  Berkshire Hathaway, Buffet’s celebrated entity, is a holding 
company consisting of, among other things, several large insurers or reinsurers.  Regarding the 
company and insurance, Buffett observed: 
  Our core business—though we have others of great importance—is insurance.  To 
understand Berkshire, therefore, it is necessary that you understand how to evaluate an 
insurance company.  The key determinants are:  (1) the amount of float that the business 
generates; (2) its cost; and (e) most critical of all, the long-term outlook for both of these 
factors. 
  To being with, float is money we hold but don’t own.  In an insurance operation, 
float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that 
sometimes extends over many years.  During that time, the insurer invests the money.  
This pleasant activity typically carries with it a downside:  The premiums that an insurer 
takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay.  That leaves 
it running an “underwriting loss,” which is the cost of float.  An insurance business has 
value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise 
incur to obtain funds.  But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than 
market rates for money. 
. . . . 
  If our insurance operations are to generate low-cost float over time, they must:  
underwrite with unwavering discipline; (b) reserve conservatively; and (c) avoid an 
aggregation of exposures that would allow a supposedly “impossible” incident to 
threaten their solvency. 
See id. at 7, 8.  See generally MARK S. DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
INSURANCE ch. 1 (8th ed. 2005) (discussing risk and insurance generally). 
  What Buffett fails to mention (perhaps because he enjoys an apparently well-deserved 
reputation as an ethical capitalist) is that an insurer can attempt to improve its cost of float and 
income by delaying the payment of claims—by paying later than due the losses that must “it 
eventually must pay.”  This can take the form of a merely lackadaisical attitude toward paying 
claims.  Everyone at an insurance company, from top to bottom knows that if claims are paid slower 
rather than faster, the insurer makes at least a modest amount of additional interest, knowledge that 
can sap an insurer’s will to pay claims with alacrity.  Among unscrupulous insurers, there can 
develop a culture or even a business model of purposefully delaying claims, perhaps by making 
pretextual requests for additional information, pretending to mislay files, quibbling about a 
policyholder’s documentation and verification of a claim, or simply waiting to pay the claim for 
several weeks simply to enjoy greater investment income.  New York Insurance Law § 5106 and its 
implementing regulations, like most state unfair claims practices laws, attempts to counter this 
insurer incentive by subjecting unpaid claims to a high interest rate or fine. 
  Although the Shady Grove allegations against Allstate alleging conscious policy of 
deliberately pretending not to receive claims and documentation and then purposefully delaying 
payment even after all the paperwork has concededly been received (see supra note 42-44 and 
accompanying text, summarizing allegations) may sound excessively paranoid, substantial evidence 
exists to suggest that notwithstanding laws like § 5106, insurers engage in such misbehavior, 
something I have labeled “institutionalized bad faith” because it occurs as a consequence of 
deliberate company policy rather than mistakes by agents in the field.  See David Evans, Insurers 
Hold Billions in Federal Death Benefits in Unprotected Accounts,  BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 1, 
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2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/31/AR2010073100035.html (describing as “institutionalized bad faith” 
life insurer practice of inducing beneficiaries to leave death benefit funds in a “retained asset 
account” with the insurer rather than demanding immediate payment, a ploy that permits insurer to 
continue to benefit from float on premium and investment dollars).  See also David Evans, Fallen 
Soldiers Families Denied Cash as Insurers Profit, BLOOMBERG NEWS, July 28, 2010, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-28/fallen-soldiers-families-denied-cash-payout-as-life-
insurers-boost-profit.html (using “institutionalized bad faith” term to describe automobile insurer 
practice of uniformly making non-negotiable “lowball”  settlement offers regardless of individual 
facts, in so-called “Minor Injury, Soft Tissue” injury cases); David Zax, When The Brain Breaks, 
YALE ALUMNI MAGAZINE, Nov./Dec. 2010 at 20 (describing Ph.D. economist suffering soft tissue 
injury to brain from low-impact, low-speed, rear-end collision, causing serious injury that 
dramatically damaged much of her cognitive ability:  after the accident, “I couldn’t add up my time 
sheet.”).  Describing the accident, one that should surely be disparaged by defense counsel arguing 
before a jury, victim Anne Forrest stated that she “was hit from behind.  I was looking left in order 
to merge into traffic, and my head swung from side to side and backwards and forwards.  It was a 
slow-speed accident, a seemingly insignificant accident.  There was some damage to my bumper.”  
Id. 
  Regarding insurers succumbing to the temptation to purposely delay payment to profit 
from investment float, I have seen an affidavit from a former AIG employee alleging that company 
policy was for local representatives to hold checks from the home office for days or even weeks 
before delivering them to claims.  (I, of course, am not in a position to assess the truth of the 
affidavit, but even if the product of a disgruntled former employee, it surely suggests the potential 
for problems in this regard.)  In addition, evidence presented at trial has suggested that major 
insurers have substantial incentives to quibble about the amount of payment due on injury claims.  
See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LITIGATION ROAD:  THE STORY OF CAMPBELL V. STATE FARM chs. 16, 
17 (2008) (discussing evidence of bad faith presented at trial against major insurer). 
  In short, N.Y. Ins. Law § 5106 addresses a major problem that is hard to police, even with 
statutory penalties.  Arguably, this reflects the substantive policy of New York at least as much as 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 901(b).  Interestingly, one of the implementing regulations to § 5106 appears to 
envision that aggrieved policyholders would indeed be bringing class actions against insurers. 
If any applicant [for payment of a claim] is a member of a class in a class action brought 
for payment of benefits, but is not a named party, interest shall not accumulate on the 
disputed claim or element of a claim until a class which includes such applicant is 
certified by court order, or such benefits are authorized in that action by Appellate Court 
decision, whichever is earlier. 
See 11 N.Y. C.R.R. § 65-3.9(c). 
  This regulation was originally promulgated in 1973 but extensive changes were made 
when New York’s no-fault statute, N.Y. Ins. Law. Article 51, was substantially revised in 1977.  
Additional revisions took place in 1999, but were required to be re-promulgated in 2001 due to 
procedural discrepancies resulting in the invalidation of the 1999 promulgation.  See Medical Soc’y 
of the State of N.Y. v. Levin, 712 N.Y. S.2d 745 (Sup. Ct., N. Y. Co., 2000) (invalidating 
regulations on grounds of non-compliance with state Administrative Procedure Act);  Medical 
Soc’y of the State of N.Y. v. Serio, 749 N.Y.S.2d 227, 228 (App. Div. 2002) (noting re-
promulgation of regulations to correct earlier infirmity). 
  If one is to make the functional assessment of state law urged by the Shady Grove dissent, 
it certainly would appear colorable to conclude that this regulation effectively authorizes a penalty 
class action regarding interest on past due payments, or at least reflects New York public policy 
favoring such actions—a policy post-dating the 1975 enactment of § 901(b).  Although the face of § 
5106 may not so provide, insurance is historically heavily regulated and legislators enact insurance 
statutes with an expectation that their meaning and enforcement will be developed through 
administrative regulation.  Although one of the virtues of the Scalia plurality is that courts are 
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Insurers have little incentive to behave well because victimized 
medical vendors have little incentive to sue slow-paying insurers in the 
absence of the availability of a class action.187  Contrary to the 
arguments raised by those lobbying for the prohibition on statutory class 
actions, it appears simply untrue that the presence of a statutory penalty, 
even one providing for recovery of counsel fees, guarantees that there 
exists sufficient incentive to bring meritorious suits for small injuries.  If 
this argument of the lobbyists is wrong, the premise underlying § 
901(b)—that it is overkill—is also incorrect. 
Of course, my analysis could be “wrong” in the sense that after 
sustained examination it would be rejected by reasonable legislators in 
favor of the Ratner view.  It would not be the first time that reasonable 
observers preferred the insights of a Marvin Frankel or Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg to my differing analyses.  But regardless of who is correct, the 
inarguable point is that § 901(b) arrived on the scene and became part of 
state law with almost no serious reflection.  It was added, however, to 
thoughtful class action law years in the making that was modeled on a 
successful and tested federal procedural rule.  Neither the legislature nor 
the executive appears to have seriously examined or debated the 
arguments in favor of the penalty limitation.  The general public was 
never even informed of the matter or given a chance to assess the 
arguments for, or against, a penalty limitation.  This aspect of the 
legislation appears to have been solely the province of political insiders 
engaged in some last-minute tinkering designed to secure smooth 
enactment. 
Under these circumstances, courts would do well to hesitate before 
embracing the view that § 901(b) represents some considered 
 
spared this difficult inquiry, one can certainly argue that courts applying New York law have erred 
in too quickly concluding that § 901(b) barred class action enforcement of the applicable insurance 
law.  Certainly, as discussed herein (text and accompanying notes supra), the mere existence of the 
two percent per month interest charges was not in many cases enough incentive to prompt victims 
of slow insurance company payment to vindicate their rights in court. 
 187. Although a medical provider such as Shady Grove may achieve some economy of scale in 
routinizing a system of suing medical insurers for delayed payment violating N.Y. Ins. Law § 5106, 
many of its patients no doubt generate relatively modest bills that, standing alone, are not 
sufficiently large to justify the time, expense, aggravation, and opportunity cost of litigation.  
Depending upon state law and the nature of any agreements with insurers, a medical provider or 
other vendor in this position may be able to style its claims as bringing an action for anticipatory 
breach of contract.  But in addition to the obvious problem of § 5106 being a statutory duty rather 
than a contractual one, a significant body of state law treats insurance claims as inapt for 
acceleration and consolidation on a theory of anticipatory breach.  See Hazel Beh & Jeffrey W. 
Stempel, Misclassifying the Insurance Policy:  The Unforced Errors of Unilateral Contract 
Characterization, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 85, 150-55 (2010). 
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determination of the State of New York and its citizens.  While 
legislation has been likened, to paraphrase Bismarck, to sausage-making 
where too close a view of the process can be distasteful,188 the resulting 
legislative product is positive law entitled to legal force, at least within 
its sphere of operation.  But this hardly requires that an on-point Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure yield to a “law fragment” that was never well 
vetted by political elites nor vetted at all by the electorate.  The Shady 
Grove dissent’s attempt to privilege suspicious § 901(b) over Federal 
Rule 23 is all the more ironic when one considers that the primary thrust 
of the 1975 New York legislation was to bring state class action practice 
into harmony with federal practice.  Certainly, this is what any 
reasonable member of the electorate reading news accounts of the 
legislation would believe (and presumably support).  Limitations on 
penalty class actions were simply not under public scrutiny. 
Indeed, because § 901(b) was not under much scrutiny from New 
York’s elite policy makers, it is not clear whether support for the penalty 
limitation was viewed as merely an express means of harmonizing the 
new state law with Federal Rule 23 or was instead a considered attempt 
to make New York class action law narrower than the federal 
counterpart on which it was modeled.  This is the other great irony of 
having Ratner v. Chemical Bank serve as a rallying point for § 901(b).  
In Ratner, the court denied class action treatment of a TILA penalty 
action based on the language of Federal Rule 23.  The Ratner Court did 
not need the express language of § 901(b) in order to avoid the perceived 
harm of the potentially “annihilating” class action feared by the bill’s 
opponents.  Federal Rule 23 was sufficient.  Although federal courts 
differ over the issue, Ratner suggests that § 901(b) was unnecessary or 
 
 188. Otto von Bismarck, the master politician and founder of modern Germany in the late 
Nineteenth Century, allegedly opined that “[i]f you like law and sausages, you should never watch 
either one being made.”  See Robert Pear, If Only Laws Were Like Sausages, N.Y. TIMES,  Dec. 5, 
2010, at 3, col. 1 (“Week in Review” section).  However, one reporter familiar with the legislative 
process found that “a visit to a sausage factory [near Washington, D.C.] suggests that Bismarck and 
today’s politicians [who often quote Bismarck] are mistaken.  In many ways, that quotation is 
offensive to sausage makers; their process is better controlled and more predictable.”  Id.  
  “In a real sausage plant,” [Rutgers public policy] Professor [Alan] Rosenthal said, 
“everybody is on the same team, trying to produce bratwurst or knockwurst.  In the 
legislative sausage factory, at least half the people don’t want to make sausage.  Or they 
want to make a different kind.  . . . 
  Big bills often include special-interest provisions whose origin is a mystery.  By 
contrast, [a sausage master] knows exactly where his ingredients come from. 
Id. at 3, cols. 3-4.  As previously discussed (text and accompanying supra note 156, § 901(b) has 
many traits of special-interest legislation even if Bismarck and others may be misinformed in 
likening it to sausage-making. 
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that some support for the state limitation may have stemmed from a 
mistaken view that federal courts always frowned upon class actions in 
statutory penalty cases. 
Most likely, however, the legislative history of § 901(b) suggests 
simply that the legislature did not give the matter much thought and 
simply rushed to judgment on the basis of glib pronouncements about 
the efficacy of penalties to spur individual actions for redress and the 
inordinate dangers of aggregating statutory penalty claims.  In any event, 
the Shady Grove dissent’s lionization of § 901(b) as a statement of 
public-regarding compromise and widespread consensus seems 
demonstrably incorrect when the legislative background of the law 
receives closer examination. 
IV  THE UNEXPECTED VIRTUES OF FORMALISM IN SHADY GROVE AND 
BEYOND 
Although some legislative decisions are, like some sports victories, 
“ugly” rather than artistic, all state laws require judicial deference absent 
unconstitutionality or fatal defects in their formation (defects sufficiently 
large that the provisions do not qualify as duly enacted “laws”).  Under 
the Erie doctrine, in the absence of applicable federal law, such state 
laws provide controlling rules of decision on substantive points no 
matter how much wiser elements of the legal profession might disagree 
with that substance. 
Erie itself provides a good illustration of both the concept and its 
privileging of state prerogatives and federal-state consistency over 
aspirations to more frequently apply “better” rules of law.  Recall than in 
Erie, the applicable state law (Pennsylvania) in a case brought by a 
plaintiff injured due to alleged railroad negligence in maintaining its 
vehicles, tracks, or footpaths treated the plaintiff using the footpath as a 
mere “trespasser” to whom the railroad owed little obligation, 
notwithstanding that the path was widely used by area pedestrians.189  In 
contrast, the federal common law rule applicable under Swift v. Tyson, 
treated such plaintiffs as invitees to whom a duty of reasonable care was 
owed.  If, as Plaintiff Tompkins alleged, he was hit by an unsecured train 
 
 189. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 70 (1938) (“[U]nder the law of Pennsylvania, 
as declared by its highest court, persons who use pathways along the railroad right of way—that is a 
longitudinal pathway as distinguished from a crossing—are to be deemed trespassers; and that the 
railroad is not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its negligence, unless it 
be wanton or wilful [sic].”). 
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door, grappling hook or the like,190 most would agree that the federal 
common law at the time made more sense as a matter of substantive tort 
law and public policy191 but under Erie this less hospitable judicial 
treatment of such victims was required because federal deference to the 
state law was required.  Tompkins had to “die” in order that federalism 
might “live,” at least live better than had been the case under Swift v. 
Tyson.192 
Although, as Erie itself shows, 180-degree judicial turns can occur 
even after a century of seemingly settled law, but that is hardly the norm.  
Although Erie—both the decision and the doctrine—can be criticized,193 
it appears to be overwhelmingly accepted as an improvement on Swift 
and is, as a practical matter, probably here to stay in American law.194  
 
 190. See id. at 69 (“[Tompkins] claimed that the accident occurred through negligence in the 
operation, or maintenance, of the train; that he was rightfully on the premises as licensee because on 
a commonly used beaten footpath which ran for a short distance alongside the tracks; and that he 
was struck by something which looked like a door projecting from one of the moving cars.”). 
 191. See id. at 70 (quoting Tompkins v. Erie R. Co., 90 F.2d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 1937) (under 
federal common law, “it is well settled that the question of the responsibility of railroad for injuries 
caused by its servants is one of general law [and the rule is that where] the public has made open 
and notorious use of a railroad right of way for a long period of time and without objection, the 
company owes a duty of care in the operation of its trains. . . . It is likewise generally recognized 
law that a jury may find that negligence exists toward a pedestrian using a permissive path on the 
railroad right of way if he is hit by some object projecting from the side of the train.”)). 
 192.  Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
 193.  For example, the Erie Court could have, in my view, announced the overruling of Swift v. 
Tyson and nonetheless given Tompkins the benefit of the more enlightened federal tort rule on the 
ground that there was sufficient federal interest in uniformity due to the massively interstate 
presence of railroad right of ways, their danger, and the need for uniformity regarding permissive 
users of railroad pathways across the country that was comparable in importance to the goal of 
uniformity of outcomes in federal and state courts.  Although there is no “general federal common 
law” after Erie, there continues to exist federal common law in areas of sufficient federal interest 
and importance.  See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (federal common law 
applies to interstate pollution dispute).  But see WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 60 (stating that the Illinois 
v. Milwaukee case “seemed to some to go very far” in using expansive concept of proper use of 
federal common law).  Almost certainly, Professor Wright and mainstream federal courts and 
procedure scholars would reject my imagined different result in Erie on similar grounds.  After 
seventy years of Erie, it is simply too difficult for mainstream lawyers to imagine a different result 
in the case once Swift v. Tyson was displaced.  But this alternative Erie holding hardly seems more 
strained than judicial efforts to convert state procedural rules to substantive law as did the Gasperini 
majority and the Shady Grove dissent.  Ironically, another case of federal common law cited by 
Professor Wright involved railroad liability and the Court’s invocation of federal common law to 
apply a substantive rule more protective of the railroad.  See Francis v. S. Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445 
(1948) (holding that application of pre-Erie federal common law cases providing that passengers 
riding free on railroad are entitled to recover for injury only in cases of gross negligence, overriding 
Utah state law providing for liability in event of ordinary negligence for injuries to such 
passengers).  Francis is discussed in WRIGHT, supra note 2, § 60. 
 194. See, e.g., TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 2 , at ch. 5 (presenting positive or at least non-
critical view of Erie concept even if noting problems or criticisms of Erie doctrine in operation);  
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Consequently, federal courts are likely to remain in the business of 
occasionally applying some wrong-headed state substantive laws in 
diversity jurisdiction cases.  Despite the arguable net resulting increase 
in application of disfavored law, Erie greatly reduces instances of 
disparate federal-state outcomes.  Although Plaintiff Tompkins was 
stripped of a $30,000 jury verdict,195 he was accorded the substantive 
“protection” of Pennsylvania state law, such as it was.  Arguably this 
was all to which he was entitled once one disregards the accident of 
diversity jurisdiction.196 
Despite the seeming command of Erie, one can make a strong 
argument that deference to state substantive law need not mean servility 
or overly expansive application.  Where a state law is unwise, federal 
courts would do well to be sure that it is truly sufficiently substantive for 
its application to be commanded by Erie.  Where legislation is the 
product of haste, misinformation, or unduly narrow interest group 
power, or where there is little evidence of public support or strong public 
benefit, courts can legitimately take a restrained view in applying the 
problematic law unless the law clearly qualifies as substantive for 
purposes of Erie.  Where aggressive application of the state law is in 
tension with applicable federal law or policy, this logically counsels for 
some restraint in the use of functionalism to deem state procedural rules 
substantive rules of decision in disguise. 
Shady Grove presented this type of situation.  Consequently, the 
dissent’s great deference to § 901(b) and hailing of it as an example of 
public-regarding compromise and consensus seems in error.  Unlike the 
standard for testing the excessiveness of jury awards at issue in 
Gasperini, the penalty limitation does not appear to meet mainstream 
 
JAMES, JR. ET AL., supra note 2, §§ 2.36-2.39 (same, although displaying more sympathy for Swift v. 
Tyson and its rationale); WRIGHT, supra note 2, §§ 54-60 (same). 
 195.  See Erie, 304 U.S. at 70.  According to the popular online service, The Inflation 
Calculator, $30,000 in 1938 dollars would be $452,096.25 in 2009 dollars.  Although this is a 
substantial amount, it may have actually undervalued the seriousness of his injury and disability.  
See infra note 196. 
 196. Tompkins may also have been something less than blameless in the matter.  He was 
walking along the railroad footpath during the wee hours after a night of apparently extensive 
drinking, raising the prospect that he wandered upon or too close to the railroad track.  See Irving 
Younger, Observation:  What Happened in Erie, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1011 (1978).  A jury faced with 
the prevailing contributory negligence doctrine of the time (in both federal and state courts) had to 
choose between giving Tompkins nothing or an award consistent with the degree of his injuries 
rather than apportioning the award to account for any comparative negligence.  In the aftermath of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, Tompkins “died severely disabled and destitute.”  See SUBRIN 
ET AL., supra note 2, at 827 (citing Bob Rizzi, Erie Memoirs Reveal Drama, Tragedy, 63 HARV. L. 
RECORD, Sept. 24, 1976, at 2). 
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law reform concerns that animated CPLR § 5501.  Faced with the Shady 
Grove situation and the legal, but arguably tarnished status of § 901(b), 
one might engage in a more realistic and critical analysis of § 901(b)’s 
birth and legitimacy and conclude that § 901(b) is simply too ill-thought 
and insufficiently examined to count as important state law and policy 
entitled to deference sufficient to displace otherwise applicable federal 
law in the form of Federal Rule 23.  Or one might engage in a different, 
less politically cynical analysis of § 901(b) such as that found in Justice 
Stevens’s Shady Grove concurrence and conclude that without regard to 
the quality of § 901(b)’s underlying analysis, it is too insufficient an 
expression of state substantive legal policy to displace an otherwise 
clearly applicable federal procedural rule. 
Both of these approaches incur the cost of committing the evaluator 
to substantial examination of state lawmaking and public policy and 
carry the risk of inconsistent or inaccurate assessments shaped by the 
values of the assessor, who may like or dislike the legislation and, 
through the magic of functionalism, now is given greater opportunity to 
apply personal preferences to the assessment of case situations.  Even if 
the process costs of extensive judicial assessment of state law are 
manageable, there exist significant deliberation costs as jurists will 
undoubtedly differ as to the wisdom of state legislation and the 
deference to which it is entitled once one looks behind text.  I find § 
901(b) an appallingly bad provision enacted hastily on the basis of 
shallow, unsubstantiated, and incorrect contentions by vested interests.  
Others may deem it a wise response to the potential evils of class 
certification and its potential for litigation blackmail. 
Under these circumstances, the formalist route of Justice Scalia’s 
Shady Grove plurality has much to recommend it as a means of avoiding 
judicial debate over the background and merits of state legislation as 
well as a means of lowering adjudication costs and conserving judicial 
resources.  Although formalism also provides plenty of opportunity for 
judges to silently inject personal preferences into the analysis, it can, 
when applied fairly, have a simplifying and discretion-suppressing 
effect.  And in Erie matters, somewhat less judicial opportunity for 
discretion may be a fair price to pay for greater efficiency, predictability, 
certainty, and avoidance of evaluation of the nature of litigation than 
obtains when justices look behind state procedural rules to locate and 
evaluate their substantive content. 
Shady Grove provides a good illustration of the benefits of such 
reasonable formalism for Erie questions.  By looking almost solely at the 
applicable scope of a Federal Rule of Procedure, the Scalia plurality 
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avoids both the logistical costs of sustained examination of § 901(b), its 
derivation, its place in the constellation of New York substantive law, 
and its relative importance to the state body politic.  Although this can 
perhaps permit decisions that ride roughshod over strong state interests 
embedded within a procedural rule or code, this almost certainly was not 
the case in Shady Grove.  The New York legislature wanted New York 
law to largely mirror Federal Rule 23.  Widely followed federal case law 
applying Federal Rule 23 resisted class action treatment of statutory 
penalty claims.  The application of Federal Rule 23 to a case validly in 
federal court rather than use of § 901(b) does little or no violence to New 
York public policy and is hardly unfair to defendant Allstate, 
particularly if there is any truth to plaintiff’s allegations of intentional 
foot-dragging in paying for medical services to insured accident victims. 
Unexpectedly but importantly, the formalism of the Shady Grove 
plurality also would logically have the beneficial effect of prompting 
states to more often engage in greater scrutiny of procedural rules and 
the policies imbedded in them.  It may also prompt states to more often 
determine for themselves whether the policies are of such importance 
that they merit codification in the state’s obviously substantive statutes 
in order to avoid the reach of the Federal Rules envisioned by Justice 
Scalia and his allies on the Court. 
A state law capping damages appears to be state substantive law 
that must apply under the Erie doctrine.  But where a limitation upon 
recovery is not set forth in a substantive statute but is instead bound with 
the state’s procedural rules, there is not only greater Erie conflict but 
also greater difficulty ascertaining the degree to which the limitation is 
substantive or procedural and whether it implicates the important state 
policies to which Justices Harlan and Stevens sought to be sensitive.  
But if the Shady Grove plurality approach becomes the Court’s 
established approach to Erie problems, state political actors going 
forward will be required to establish their substantive legal regime with 
greater clarity.197 
Consider the issue of limitations on penalty class actions.  If New 
York had introduced this as a stand-alone piece of legislation to 
accompany the 1975 class action bill or as a revision or corrective of the 
 
 197. See Hendricks, supra note 17, at 58 (“[U]niform federal procedure will allow states to 
formulate substantive policy with knowledge of the procedures through which they will be enforced 
and will encourage state lawmakers to act openly through the substantive law rather than 
manipulated outcomes with special procedures.”).  See generally Symposium, Democracy and the 
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law, this hypothetical legislation would have likely enjoyed separate 
reporting by the press and at least some consideration by the public at 
large.  The bill would have likely required separate hearings and invited 
more reflective and substantive debate by the various interests 
comprising the body politic.  There would have been at least a chance at 
some reasoned debate over the efficacy of penalties as enforcement tools 
in the absence of class treatment and the actual degree to which 
aggregation of penalty claims posed fair or unfair risks of large 
judgments and defendant ability to pay them.  The issue of class action 
coercion would also perhaps have gotten a more serious examination 
than it has traditionally enjoyed. 
In the post-Shady Grove real world, the plurality’s approach 
arguably has already opened this possibility.  New York political actors 
reading Shady Grove now have a roadmap should they wish to make a 
limitation on statutory penalty class actions impregnable against Federal 
Rule 23 attack in cases that reach federal court through the accidents of 
CAFA and diversity jurisdiction.  They can re-enact § 901(b) as a 
substantive law.  Although the technical details of such a response to 
Shady Grove are of course more complex than I am making them sound 
(or have time to discuss in this article), this type of state “overruling” of 
an adverse Erie decision with which the state disagrees is eminently 
possible.  But to date, there appears to have been no effort in New York 
to overcome Shady Grove and ensure that Insurance Law § 5106 or other 
state penalty statutes never again gain class action treatment in federal 
court. 
This may simply reflect legislative inertia and the timing, as New 
York has not yet had its first post-Shady Grove legislative session.  Or it 
might reflect acquiescence or lack of concern, either of which would 
vindicate the Shady Grove plurality and concurrence while undermining 
the dissent’s argument that application of Federal Rule 23 has done 
some sort of real violence to the concept of federalism embodied in Erie 
jurisprudence. 
Additionally, the plurality’s formalism and occasional forcing of 
legislatures to re-examine state policy woven into state procedural 
provisions can also have the beneficial effect of forcing state legislatures 
to review and perhaps update these types of laws.  The 1975 New York 
legislation was by all accounts a positive and important law 
notwithstanding what I regard as the wrong turn taken (with minimal 
transparency) in § 901(b).  But much has happened during the past 
thirty-five years regarding attitudes toward the class action and 
consumer protection generally.  Today’s New York legislature might opt 
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for something quite different than Federal Rule 23, perhaps constraining 
class actions beyond the limitations of federal law or § 901(b).  A return 
to pre-1975 state law is not beyond question. 
Although I would disagree with any of these class-limiting laws as 
a matter of my own substantive preferences, these decisions are of 
course for New York to make—so long as it makes these decisions as 
part of its substantive rules of decision for adjudicated cases and as part 
of the state’s articulation of the substantive rights and duties of its 
citizenry, rather than encasing such choices in state procedural codes 
that conflict with the Federal Civil Rules.  By forcing substantive bars to 
litigation into a state’s substantive law, the approach of the Shady Grove 
plurality can serve as a de facto spur for government “in the sunshine” 
with more open focus on the merits of public policy issues and less low 
visibility legislation “hidden” in the state’s procedural laws. 
To the extent states continue to put arguably substantive law into 
procedural codes, these provisions “deserve” to be displaced by on-point 
federal rules in cases properly in federal court.  At some point, the 
Sibbach-Byrd-Hanna-Shady Grove line of cases must stand for the 
proposition that the tail of odd state procedural provisions or practices 
cannot wag the federal litigation dog and that federal judges are not mere 
“ventriloquist’s dummies” forced to mouth state law despite having a 
thick batch of applicable federal rules. 
The Sibbach-Hanna-Shady Grove analysis is particularly apt where 
problematic state law is embedded in procedural rule covering the same 
territory as does a federal civil rule.  These cases truly do not present the 
relatively unguided Erie choice of York or similar cases.  When a rule of 
federal procedure is enacted, the federal judiciary and its constituents 
(lawyers, scholars, government agencies, litigants, public policy interest 
groups) have spoken, as has the Supreme Court, with Congress giving at 
least tacit support or at the very least not disagreeing sufficiently to 
interfere.  At this point, great deference should be given to applying the 
federal rule in federal court actions.  This deference can logically be 
overcome by a clear showing that state controlling substantive law is to 
the contrary. 
Further, Shady Grove involved CAFA jurisdiction, an area where 
Congress spoke strongly regarding its desire to provide a federal forum 
for certain types of class actions.  Although many CAFA proponents 
would undoubtedly be unpleasantly surprised at the pro-plaintiff 
outcome in Shady Grove, which permitted doctors to sue an insurer via 
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the class device,198 this arguably only underscores the benefits of 
formalist adherence to validly promulgated federal rules and statutes.  
Result orientation is forced to take a back seat to playing by the federal 
procedural rules in the federal litigation arena.  For that reason, the 
concern for vindicating federal policy in Byrd is also enhanced by the 
Shady Grove approach and outcome.199  At some point, the deference to 
state legislation reflected in the Shady Grove dissent is likely to have 
negative implications for the ability of federal courts to run themselves.  
When in doubt as to the degree the scope of federal procedural rules and 
the degree of federal-state rules conflict, the federal rule should govern.  
In addition to working well in Shady Grove and forcing greater 
democratic deliberation in the states—at least if they want their 
substantive policies to resist displacement by federal rules in federal 
courts - the plurality’s approach appears reasonable for use in future Erie 
cases.  It is sufficiently consistent with key Erie precedents, other than 
perhaps Gasperini, although it too, can be reconciled with Shady Grove 
in light of the lack of codified federal standards governing the vacating 
of excessive jury awards.  Applying Shady Grove rather than Gasperini 
going forward would require minimal federalism costs in return for gains 
in protection of federal procedural prerogatives, simplicity, 
predictability, and efficiency.  Gasperini, it should be recalled, displaced 
Federal Rule 59 with CPLR § 5501 through a bit of straw man sleight of 
hand in that the Gasperini majority described the federal standard for 
assessing the excessiveness of jury verdicts as whether the verdict 
“shocks the conscience” of the court.  This unguided homage to judicial 
gut feeling was contrasted with the seemingly more rational New York 
 
 198. See Burbank, supra note 47 (CAFA “resulted from years of intense lobbying” by various 
interest groups and was part of “a trio of ‘tort reform’ measures sought by the Bush administration,” 
although the resulting statute may be “inimical to the interests” of many tort reform advocates); 
Stempel, Class Actions and Limited Vision, supra note 99, at 1142-48 (discussing background of 
CAFA and legislative intend to tame perceived abusive class actions, particularly those brought in 
state courts).  Shady Grove suggests more than a little prescience in Professor Burbank’s 
observation. 
 199. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (determining that where 
suit is in federal court on basis of diversity jurisdiction, issue of whether injured lineman was 
independent contractor (rather than employee) and thus outside scope of South Carolina workers 
compensation law and its limitations on damage awards subject to jury determination 
notwithstanding state practice because of strong federal policy favoring jury determination of 
disputed facts).  Byrd, of course, is correctly decided, but would have been simpler, more direct, and 
more satisfying if the Court had simply stated that in federal court, the Seventh Amendment governs 
the availability of the jury, period.  The Seventh Amendment in my view operates as something of a 
“super” Federal Civil Rule and where on point displaces contrary state practice regarding the 
allocation of the factfinding function at trial. 
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law, that allowed setting aside of a jury verdict where the verdict 
“materially deviates” from reasonable precedent.200 
Although the federal reporters are strewn with plenty of precedent 
using the “shocks the conscience” language,201 anyone who has ever 
practiced in federal court knows that a jury verdict is in great danger of 
being set aside as against the weight of the evidence if the presiding 
federal trial judge views the amount awarded as unreasonable.  Federal 
district judges do not need to be “shocked” to intervene in such 
situations.  Their desire to prevent unreasonable compensation is 
reflected in numerous decisions.202 
By any reasonable understanding of language, an “against the 
weight of the evidence” standard presents a lower bar to ordering a new 
trial than a “shocks the conscience” test.  By suggesting that only where 
the trial judge was aghast or amazed by the size of the verdict could 
there be a new trial, the Gasperini majority presented a misleading 
 
 200. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 425 (1996). 
 201. See, e.g., Eich v. Board of Regents, Central Mo. State Univ., 350 F.3d 752, 763-64 (8th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that for new trial, the verdict must shock the conscience of court; a new trial 
requires a “monstrous” or “shocking” result).  See JAMES, JR., HAZARD, JR. & LEUBSDORF, supra 
note 2, § 7.29 (noting existence of shock-the-conscience review of verdict size, but also noting 
modern trend toward greater supervision of jury verdicts); MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra 
note 45, § 59.13[2][g][B] (stating that “[i]n a federal question case, a district court will ordinarily 
deem an award excessive it if ‘shocks the judicial conscience.’” (footnoted omitted)).  However, an 
examination of the footnote’s supporting cases suggests that something far less than shock is 
sufficient for at least some federal courts to deem a verdict excessive and to order a new trial.  See, 
e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (establishing that punitive damages 
are subject to review pursuant to Due Process Clause and finding $4 million punitive damages 
award remitted to $2 million for misrepresentation about touched up paint job on car “grossly 
excessive,” but eschewing shock-the-conscience rhetoric); McCoy v. Goldberg, 810 F. Supp. 539, 
542 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding a court may overturn verdict that is “grossly excessive”). 
 202. See, e.g., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 45, § 59.13[2][f] & [g] (stating courts 
routinely order new trials where verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or is “entirely 
disproportionate” to plaintiff’s injury); TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 2, at 963 (stating courts 
commonly order new trials where a jury verdict is “excessive”); JAMES, JR., HAZARD, JR. & 
LEUBSDORF, supra note 2, § 7.29; 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE:  CIVIL § 2806 (2d ed. 1995) (stating federal courts routinely order new trials when 
verdict is against the weight of the evidence). 
  In a case Professors James, Hazard and Leubsdorf describe as summarizing “well” the 
prevailing federal test, the court stated that when facing a Federal Rule 59 new trial motion “it is the 
duty of the trial judge to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, if he is of the opinion that the 
verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence . . . even though there may be substantial evidence 
which would prevent the direction of a verdict.”  Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350, 
352-53 (4th Cir. 1941), and quoted in JAMES, JR., HAZARD, JR. & LEUBSDORF, supra note 2, at 474. 
  Although the Yeatts test is typically associated with ordering a new trial because the judge 
thought that the prevailing party should not have obtained a favorable verdict, its logic applies to 
review of verdict size as well as verdict direction and suggests that federal courts prior to Gasperini 
were not waiting for jaw-droppingly absurd jury verdicts as a prerequisite to granting a new trail. 
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picture of actual federal court practice and modest or nonexistent degree 
to which it differed from New York’s articulated new trial standard.  
Consequently, had Gasperini been decided the other way, applying 
Federal Rule 59 rather than CPLR § 5501 to a photographer’s suit for 
lost photographs, his initial jury verdict of $450,000 would almost 
certainly have been set aside for a new trial.  The $100,000 remittitur 
imposed under the New York new trial standard also sounds very much 
within the range of likely federal outcomes for new trial motions in cases 
of this type. 
In addition to perhaps reflecting the dearth of trial court experience 
on the Gasperini Court (where not a single Justice had served as a trial 
judge and few had been federal trial attorneys), an unfortunate 
demographic continued with the current Court (where only Justice 
Sotomayor has served as a trial judge)203 Gasperini, like the Shady 
Grove dissent, arguably reflects excessive concern with attempting to 
achieve maximum congruence in federal and state trial outcomes.  The 
concern is misplaced for two reasons. 
First, modest differences between federal and state courts are a 
necessary cost of federalism.  Erie “hawks” – those who give the most 
limited reach to federal procedural rules – wrongly see federalism in this 
context as unvarying equivalence.  But federalism also entails accepting 
some degree of difference between the two systems, just as state-to-state 
differences are accepted as a cost of doing business in American 
government and law. 
Second, and perhaps more important and certainly more inarguable, 
a quest for intra-court symmetry is doomed to failure and inconsistent 
with the inevitable differences in case outcomes that the legal system is 
forced to embrace as a concession to reality.  The differences between 
state and federal law in Erie questions, although sometimes large, are 
often relatively modest when compared to the inevitable differences that 
result when the system allows adjudication by different lay jurors 
presided over by different judges with litigants of different attractiveness 
 
 203. See, e.g., DAVID G. SAVAGE, GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (5th ed. 2010) 
(providing biographies of all justices that indicate lack of trial court experience for all members of 
Shady Grove Court except Justice Sotomayor); ROGER K. NEWMAN, THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL 
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW (2009) (providing short biographies of Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, 
Scalia, Kennedy, Stevens, and Thomas that reflect lack of trial court experience); BIOGRAPHICAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT:  THE LIVES AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF THE JUSTICES 
(Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2006) (same regarding all members of Shady Grove Court except Justice 
Sotomayor); THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Kermit 
L. Hall, James W. Ely, Jr. & Joel B. Grossman eds., 2005) (same). 
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and resources (but essentially the same type of legal claims and injuries) 
represented by different attorneys of varying skills and support. 
As noted above, Mr. Gasperini’s initially large jury verdict was 
imperiled under either federal or New York new trial standards.  As also 
illustrated by cases such as Ratner v. Chemical Bank, federal trial courts 
possess sufficient power to prevent unduly unwieldy or coercive class 
actions sufficient to harmonize outcomes in these cases with the 
prohibition of § 901(b).  Compare this to everyday events in litigation 
for which there is no Erie intervention:  One plaintiff is awarded $1 
million for accident-related pain and suffering while a similarly situated 
plaintiff in another court receives nothing or a much lower award.  One 
defendant wins via summary judgment during the early stages of 
litigation while a second’s motion is narrowly denied, leading to a trial 
and imposition of multi-million dollar liability. 
In a nation as large and diverse as the United States, much 
variegation in litigation outcomes is unavoidable, a reality that counsels 
against federal courts being too skittish about applying federal procedure 
merely because of its potential for differences with state court outcomes.  
To be sure, straight up or hard core differences in substantive law, as 
existed in Erie itself, require deference to the state substantive law.  But 
such deference is hardly so essential in the murkier realm of the 
questions posed in Hanna, Gasperini, and Shady Grove.  Arguably 
Ragan and Walker fall into this category as well even though the Court 
in both cases was solidly behind deference to the state rule in question.  
In cases like Byrd, which implicate the federal constitution (specifically 
the Seventh Amendment), there should be even less concern that 
application of federal practice runs afoul of the Erie concept merely 
because there may be a different outcome had the matter been in state 
court. 
The waters of Erie will never be crystal clear in this regard.  But 
navigating them can be far simpler and more expeditious under the 
Shady Grove plurality approach, needing only some occasional 
leavening from the Harlan/Stevens functionalist search for important 
state interests in the closer cases.  If nothing else, however, the Shady 
Grove saga suggests that there is an additional benefit to the plurality’s 
more formalist, Sibbach and aggressive Hanna approach in that it can 
force state lawmaking more into the open, encouraging greater and more 
reflective debate about and scrutiny of policy decisions. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
A narrow, brittle formalism usually makes for unsatisfactory 
jurisprudence.  When coupled with primitive, hyperliteral textualism or 
reductionist presentations of a complex world, it can lead to bizarre 
results at odds with legislative intent, contracting intent, citizen 
understanding, and common sense.  But formalism has its place in the 
law’s analytic arsenal.  If not excessively narrow and fundamentalist, 
adherence to a formalist approach, like Ulysses now famous decision to 
have himself lashed to the mast to avoid responding to the Sirens’ 
Song,204 may save the courts not only from greater investment of 
adjudication resources but also may act as a modest impetus for 
government “in the sunshine” by forcing more public and separate 
consideration of serious policy issues that might otherwise get short 
shrift when appended to, or interwoven with, procedural legislation.  To 
the extent that a state proceeds to cloth substantive legal entitlements or 
immunities in procedural garb, it is far less likely to avoid federal 
procedural pre-emption in federal court litigation if the Shady Grove 
plurality approach holds in future cases.  Notwithstanding the academy’s 
general preference for functionalism and the jurisprudence of Justices 
Ginsburg, Stevens, and Harlan over formalism and the jurisprudence of 
Justice Scalia, Shady Grove shows the occasional virtues of formalism 
properly applied. 
 
 204. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS:  STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND 
IRRATIONALITY (1984) (providing a prominent recounting of the Ulysses story by a philosopher to 
illustrate potential benefits of establishing pre-existing constraints on decisionmaking).  As of 
December 2010, Elster’s use of the Ulysses analogy had been cited more than 300 times in the law 
review literature while the Ulysses and the Sirens episode has been cited more than 400 times. 
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